U.S.-France Cooperative Research: The Political Economy of Federalism
U.S.-France Cooperative Research: The Political Economy of Federalism
批准号:
9815573
负责人:
Thomas Palfrey
金额:
$1.2万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1999
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1999-03-01 至 2002-02-28
中文摘要
9815573帕尔弗里这个为期三年的奖项,以支持美国-法国经济学合作研究涉及托马斯R.加州理工学院的Palfrey和图卢兹大学(社会科学大学)的Jacques Cremer。 他们建议对联邦制的政治经济学进行研究。 大多数公共政策的结果是由联邦一级的政策和州或地方政策混合而成的。 他们的研究目标是调查决定联邦,州或地方一级政策组合的经济和政治因素,以及对公共政策结果的影响。 他们将研究不同类型的投票模式。 一个模型将重点关注与决策集中化相关的选民偏好,第二个模型着眼于对联邦授权的应用以及与环境政策和教育政策相关的国家标准。 这项合作利用了美国和法国调查人员在政治经济理论方面的互补专长。
英文摘要
9815573PalfreyThis three-year award in support of U.S.-France collaborative research in economics involves Thomas R. Palfrey of the California Institute of Technology and Jacques Cremer at the Universite de Toulouse (Universite des Sciences Sociales). They propose to conduct research on the political economy of federalism. Most public policy outcomes result from a mixture of federal level policies and state or local policies. The objective of their research is to investigate the economic and political factors that determine the mix of federal, state or local level policies and the implications for pubic policy outcomes. They will look at different types of voting models. One model will focus on voter preference in relation to centralization of policymaking and a second model looks at applications to federal mandates, and national standards related to environmental policy and education policy. The collaboration takes advantage of the complementary expertise of the US and French investigators in political economic theory.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Two Experiments on the Behavioral Equivalence of Dirty Faces Games
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批准号:2243268
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$2.36万
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财政年份:2023
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Theoretical and Experimental Research on Voting and Bargaining Games
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批准号:1426560
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$29.15万
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财政年份:2014
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Theoretical and Experimental Research on Voting and Bargaining Games
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批准号:0962802
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$31.16万
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财政年份:2010
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Theoretical and Experimental Research on Games of Incomplete Information: Applications to Voting and Bargaining
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批准号:0617820
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$32.47万
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财政年份:2006
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Imperfect Play in Games of Incomplete Information: Theory and Experiments
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批准号:0450712
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$36.78万
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财政年份:2004
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Imperfect Play in Games of Incomplete Information: Theory and Experiments
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批准号:0079301
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$51.4万
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财政年份:2000
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Collaborative Research on Spending and Incumbency in Congressional Elections: A Game-Theoretic Approach
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批准号:9224787
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$10.62万
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财政年份:1993
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Imperfect Play and Incomplete Information In Multi-Stage Games: Theory and Experiments
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批准号:9223701
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$26.19万
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财政年份:1993
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Strategic Learning in Games of Incomplete Information: Theory and Experiments
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批准号:9011828
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$19.11万
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财政年份:1990
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Collaborative Research in Individual and Group Decisions In Voluntary Collective Decision Making
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批准号:8718650
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$6.33万
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财政年份:1988
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Topics in Implementation Theory and Mechanism Design
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批准号:8815097
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$12.83万
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财政年份:1988
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
Oligopoly With Private Information (Information Science)
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批准号:8406296
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$4.94万
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财政年份:1984
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负责人:Thomas Palfrey
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依托单位:
海外基金