The Dynamics of Conceptual Change

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Conceptual change has been a significant component of all major changes of theory in science. Attempts by philosophers and historians of science to characterize conceptual change have led to two main views: conceptual change is continuous and cumulative and conceptual change is discontinuous and abrupt. Dr. Nersessian has found, however, that fine-structure analyses of transition periods between theories show both characterizations to be inadequate. Conceptual change is continuous but not simply cumulative. Providing an explanatory account for the historical data requires an investigation into the dynamics of how conceptual structures change. With the support of this grant, Dr. Nersessian will examine actual conceptual changes in science in light of cognitive theories of heuristic reasoning, conceptualization and categorization, and conceptual change. The extent of fit between these theories and three major conceptual changes will be investigated. The historical transitions she will be examining as case studies for her project are the move from medieval to Newtonian theories of motion, the subsequent move from Newtonian theories of motion to the special and general theories of relativity, and the move from Newtonian mechanics to quantum mechanics. Her analysis should deepen our understanding of how conceptual structures emerge and are adopted by scientific communities, and should also open up new areas of investigation in the cognitive sciences.