Unemployment Insurance, Recall, and Econometric Duration Models

失业保险、召回和计量经济期限模型

• 批准号: 8821721
• 负责人: Bruce Meyer
• 金额: $ 7.02万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1989
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1989-02-15 至 1992-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8821721&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Unemployment; Insurance; Recall; Econometric; Duration

The research consists of three closely related empirical projects focusing on Unemployment Insurance (UI) and the layoff-recall process. In conjunction with the empirical work is a theoretical component of econometric research, aimed at developing and testing estimators for econometric duration models, which have broad application and are less sensitive to a priori assumptions. The first project examines the fraction of the unemployment of UI recipients arising because of temporary layoffs and the effects of recall expectations on unemployment spells. The second involves the analysis of re-employment bonus experiments that are being conducted in several states. These experiments provide large monetary awards to UI claimants who find jobs quickly. The third project analyzes a data set that matches five years of longitudinal UI histories from eight states containing 385,000 spells with information about firms. %%% Unemployment Insurance (UI) is an important and expensive social welfare program. In 1985, 2.6 million people received unemployment insurance at a cost of over 15 billion dollars. Substantial theoretical work indicates that the (UI) program has major effects on the behavior of both workers and firms. The purpose of this research is to better understand these effects and to develope techniques to better estimate the magnitude of some of these effects. This research consists of three closely related empirical project focusing on the effects of Unemployment Insurance. The first examines the disincentive effects of UI on taking a job and the effect of expecting to be rehired on looking for a new job. The second examines a new group of social experiments which are designed to find ways of reducing the typical period of unemployment and, thus, UI program costs. These experiments offer special bonus payments to people who find work within a specified period of time. The third project will use a unique data set to analyze the effects of UI benefits and taxes on the behavior of workers and firms.

本研究由三个密切相关的实证项目组成 重点是失业保险（UI）和解雇召回过程。 与实证工作相结合的是一个理论组成部分， 计量经济学研究，旨在开发和测试估计 计量经济持续期模型，具有广泛的应用， 对先验假设敏感。 第一个项目考察了失业率的比例， 因临时裁员而产生的受助人以及 回想一下对失业的预期。 第二个涉及到 分析正在进行的再就业奖金实验， 几个国家。 这些实验为UI提供了大量的金钱奖励 快速找到工作的求职者。 第三个项目分析一个数据集 与八个州五年的纵向UI历史相匹配 包含了385，000个关于公司的信息。 %%% 失业保险是一项重要而昂贵的社会保险。 福利计划。 1985年有260万人失业 保险费用超过150亿美元。 实质性 理论工作表明，（UI）程序对 工人和企业的行为。 本研究的目的 是更好地理解这些影响，并开发技术， 更好地估计这些影响的程度。 本研究由三个密切相关的实证项目组成 关注失业保险的影响。 第一个检查 UI对接受工作的抑制作用以及 期待着在找新工作时被重新雇用。 第二个检查 一组新的社会实验，旨在寻找 减少失业的典型时期，因此，UI程序 成本 这些实验为那些 在规定的时间内找到工作。 第三个项目将 使用独特的数据集来分析UI福利和税收的影响 工人和企业的行为。