The Theory of Government Coalitions

政府联盟理论

• 批准号: 8914294
• 负责人: Kenneth Shepsle
• 金额: $ 15.25万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-03-01 至 1993-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8914294&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Theory; Government; Coalitions

In this research the investigators propose a new theory of coalition formation in order to understand the process by which governments are assembled in multiparty parliamentary democracies. The literature on coalition theory is a rich one, extending back more than thirty years. To date, however, this literature has not come to grips with the fact that government coalitions are different from coalitions in general - - that the forming of a government is a vastly different event from that of passing a legislative bill or dividing up a pie. These latter events may be thought of as "terminal" - - once a bill is passed or a pie divided, business is essentially done. In forming a government, however, the processes of politics have only just begun. Thus, in thinking about government formation, it is essential that one incorporate the rational beliefs and expectations of the actors concerning what will happen once the government is installed. This observation allows the Principal Investigator to formulate a theory of strategic bargaining by the various parties elected to a popular assembly. Their objective is to form a government, which action requires a majority vote of support in the assembly. The various actors couch their support or opposition to a proposal for a new government in terms of their beliefs of what results will flow from installing this group of parties as opposed to that group of parties. But where are these beliefs about the future to come from? This is the crucial aspect of the research by the investigators. They define and elaborate the notion of credible promises and use this concept to develop a theory of how the various forces inside a popular assembly combine to form a government. Besides its contribution to basic knowledge, this research is of pactical significance as more and more parts of the world turn to parliamentary institutions in which many (rather than just two) parties contest for power and governmental leadership.

在这项研究中，研究人员提出了一种新的联盟形成理论，以了解多党议会民主国家政府的组建过程。 关于联盟理论的文献非常丰富，可以追溯到三十多年前。 然而，迄今为止，这些文献还没有认识到政府联盟与一般联盟不同的事实——政府的组建与通过立法法案或分蛋糕是截然不同的事件。 后面这些事件可能被认为是“终结事件”——一旦法案通过或蛋糕被分割，生意就基本上完成了。 然而，在组建政府的过程中，政治进程才刚刚开始。因此，在思考政府组建时，必须考虑到行动者对政府成立后会发生什么的理性信念和期望。 这一观察结果使首席研究员能够制定出当选进入民众议会的各党派进行战略讨价还价的理论。 他们的目标是组建政府，这一行动需要议会多数票支持。 不同的参与者对新政府提案的支持或反对取决于他们对建立这组政党而不是那组政党将会产生什么结果的信念。 但这些关于未来的信念从何而来？ 这是研究人员研究的关键方面。 他们定义和阐述了可信承诺的概念，并利用这个概念发展了一种关于人民议会内部的各种力量如何联合起来组建政府的理论。 除了对基础知识的贡献之外，这项研究还具有实际意义，因为世界上越来越多的地区转向议会机构，其中许多（而不是两个）政党争夺权力和政府领导权。