Intertemporal Politics

这个项目是一个基于成就的更新，扩展了研究者过去在制度设置中的理性行为的工作。研究的重点是冲突和合作的基础，以及它们如何随着时间的推移而变化。传统的理解强调这些基础来自社会、经济或空间分裂。这些分裂推动了对讨价还价、集体行动、联盟和联盟形成的研究。非合作博弈论产生了复杂的工具，用来模拟许多这些冲突和合作的例子。然而，许多旨在理解这些主题的形式理论都是静态的和横向的。任何特定时间点的快照都能揭示一个群体、委员会或整个社会的断层线。然而，它未能揭示导致冲突或合作的长期利益以及随着时间的推移而展开的战略利益。这项工作模拟了各种时间指标（如“年龄”），允许更细致入微地考虑时间对制度和社会生活中理性行为的影响。这项工作对许多依赖时间的过程有影响，包括：工作场所的奖励、责任和激励的分配，预期寿命的变化，人口泡沫和冲击，对退休的态度，任期限制和年龄歧视。

This project is an accomplishment based renewal extending the researcher's past work on rational behavior in institutional settings. The research focuses the bases of conflict and cooperation and how they change over time. Traditional understandings emphasize that these bases are derived from social, economic or spatial cleavages. These cleavages animate studies of bargaining, collective action, alliances and coalition formation. Non-cooperative game theory has produced sophisticated tools with which to model many of these instances of conflict and cooperation. However, much of formal theory that has turned toward understanding these subjects has been static and cross-sectional. A snapshot at any particular point in time reveals the fault lines in a group, committee, or entire society. However, it fails to reveal the long-term interests that lead to conflict or cooperation and the strategic interests that unfold over time. This work models various indicators of time (like `age`) that allow a more nuanced consideration of the impact of time on rational behavior in institutional and social life. This work has implications for many time dependent processes, including: the distribution of rewards, responsibilities, and incentives in the workplace, changing life expectancy, demographic bubbles and shocks, attitudes toward retirement, term limits and age discrimination.