Strikes and Delays in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data

本项目的目的是开发和实证检验 工会合同的策略谈判模型 谈判这项工作遵循最近的事态发展， 了解谈判的低效率和过程， 非合作谈判理论罢工等无效行为 和其他昂贵的延误通常被解释为不完整的 关于达成协议的某些关键方面的信息。它 重要的是要测试这些模型的有效性，劳动力 谈判为这种试验提供了一个自然和重要的领域。 在大多数情况下，经验研究忽略了延迟选项， 专注于罢工。这项工作将填补这一空白-- 初步分析表明，事实上， 拖延可能与罢工的作用一样重要， 合同的期限或合同的规模 议价成本 非合作谈判模型将在 这项研究包括几个制度特征：罢工或 延期和限期合同。测试的预测 这些模型将包括一组与6000名谈判人员进行谈判的数据， 合同.

The aim of this project is to develop and empirically test strategic bargaining models applied to union contract negotiations. This work follows the recent developments in the understanding of bargaining inefficiencies and processes in noncooperative bargaining theory. Inefficiencies such as strikes and other costly delays are usually explained by incomplete information about some aspect critical to reaching agreement. It is important to test the validity of such models, and labor negotiations provide a natural and important area for such tests. For the most part, empirical work has ignored the delay option, focusing solely on strikes. This work will fill that gap -- preliminary analyses show that in fact, the signaling role of delay may be just as important as the role of strikes, regardless of the duration of the contract or the magnitude of the bargaining costs. The noncooperative bargaining models that will be developed in this research include several institutional features: strike or delay and finite duration contracts. Testing the predictions of the models will involve a data set on negotiations with 6,000 contracts.