Informational Imperfections and Economic Behavior

这个项目试图扩大我们对社会和 不完全信息环境下的经济行为。 的 项目包括两个主要部分。 项目的第一部分 研究聚类，而第二个研究不完整 承包 “集群”指的是人们行为相似的情况， 尽管他们的偏好不同。 例如：Herd 行为（例如，文化或亚文化的形成） 行为标准），划分遗产的普遍做法 继承人之间的平等，以及“我也是”的政治扩散 候选人 这个项目探讨了一种基于聚类的理论， 两个关键假设：决策者希望受欢迎或受尊重， 行为是可观察的，但真正的特征是不可观察的。 在 一类数学模型，这些假设产生 集群的选择，即使真正的特点是不是 集群。 这部分研究将导致新的预测 不同市场的消费行为。 “不完全合同”是指合同往往 无法涵盖许多意外情况。 这个项目探索了一个理论 基于两个假设的不完全契约： 是那些执行合同的人无法观察到的（例如， 法院或仲裁员）和合同当事人将相互作用 再次在未来。 在一类数学模型中， 假设意味着明确合同的当事人可以离开 有些条文含糊不清，以改善含蓄的方面 他们的协议。 这部分的研究将提供见解 关于为什么合同遗漏了某些意外事件， 把它们包括在内似乎并不昂贵。

This project attempts to expand our understanding of social and economic behavior in environments with imperfect information. The project consists of two main parts. The first part of the project examines clustering, while the second studies incomplete contracting. "Clustering" refers to situations in which people act similarly, even though their preferences are different. Examples include herd behavior (for example, the formation of cultural or sub-cultural standards of behavior), the common practice of dividing estates equally among heirs, and the proliferation of "me too" political candidates. This project explores a theory of clustering based on two key assumptions: decision-makers desire popularity or esteem, and actions are observable but true characteristics are not. In a class of mathematical models, these assumptions produce clustering of choices, even when true characteristics are not clustered. This part of the study will lead to novel predictions about consumption behavior in various markets. "Incomplete contracting" refers to the fact that contracts often fail to cover many contingencies. This project explores a theory of incomplete contracts based on two assumptions: certain actions are not observable by those who enforce contracts (for example, courts or arbitrators), and parties to a contract will interact again in the future. In a class of mathematical models, these assumptions imply that parties to an explicit contract may leave some provisions ambiguous in order to improve the implicit aspects of their agreement. This part of the study will provide insights concerning why contracts leave out certain contingencies even when including them does not seem very costly.