Legislative Fiscal Policy Making with Reconsideration

近年来，各行各业的经济学者对政治经济学的问题越来越感兴趣。这一运动的一个中心目标是补充我们对政治环境（包括制度）与所采取的经济政策之间关系的理解。虽然已经取得了很大进展，但由于立法机关可能选择在法律通过之后但在实施之前重新考虑法律的某些规定，因此所产生的战略问题实际上一无所知。立法复议是实践中常见的现象。此外，它还引发了复杂的战略问题。通过一项针对未来某一时期的政策规定会改变政治格局。在法律实施之前对这些问题的进一步讨论是在不同的背景下进行的。虽然这项规定在生效之前可以改变、废除或取代，但通过这项规定改变了随后辩论的条件。本研究旨在探讨立法复议对经济政策选择的影响。分析确定并探讨了重新考虑造成政治权力高度集中的趋势（不管政策在通过之后和实施之前是否实际改变）。利用博弈论的工具，该项目进行了比较制度分析，在特定经济问题的背景下，研究了在各种替代规则和程序下重新考虑的作用。它试图理解特定机构控制（或未能控制）权力高度集中趋势的机制，并阐明其对经济政策的影响。这项研究的结果与广泛的实际问题有关。集体选择问题不仅在公共政策制定中普遍存在，而且在合作研究、教育、伙伴关系、网络和许多其他形式的社会活动中也普遍存在。这些问题是通过各种各样的正式和非正式程序来解决的。通过提高我们对程序与结果之间关系的理解，对集体选择的研究将为程序选择和制度设计提供建设性的指导。关于各种规则对代表性不足群体的影响的影响的见解可能特别有用。

In recent years, economic scholars in a wide variety of specializations have become increasingly interested in questions of Political Economy. A central objective of this movement has been to supplement our understanding of the relationships between the political environment (including institutions) and the economic policies that are adopted. Though much progress has been made, virtually nothing is known about the strategic issues arising from the possibility that a legislature might choose to reconsider some provision of a law after its passage but prior to its implementation. Legislative reconsideration is a common occurrence in practice. Moreover, it gives rise to complex strategic issues. The adoption of a policy provision for some future period changes the political landscape. Further discussion of the issues prior to the law's implementation takes place against a different backdrop. Though the provision can be changed, repealed, or replaced before it becomes effective, its adoption alters the terms of the ensuing debate. The purpose of this project is to explore the effects of legislative reconsideration on economic policy selection. The analysis identifies and explores a tendency for reconsideration to create high concentration of political power (irrespective of whether policies are actually changed after adoption and prior to implementation). Using the tools of game theory, the project undertakes comparative institutional analysis, examining the role of reconsideration under a variety of alternative rules and procedures within the context of particular economic problems. It seeks to understand the mechanisms by which particular institutions control (or fail to control) the tendency toward high concentration of power, and to elucidate the implications for economic policy.The findings of this research are relevant to a wide range of practical issues. Collective choice problems are pervasive not only in public policy making, but also in cooperative research, education, partnerships, networks, and many other forms of social activity. These problems are resolved through a wide variety of formal and informal procedures. By improving our understanding of the relationships between procedures and outcomes, the study of collective choice will provide constructive guidance concerning the choice of procedures and the design of institutions. Insights concerning the effects of various rules on the influence of underrepresented groups may prove particularly useful.