Global Change: International Negotiations on Emissions Control

全球变化：排放控制国际谈判

• 批准号: 9110460
• 负责人: Geoffrey Heal
• 金额: $ 6.73万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1992
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1992-03-15 至 1994-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9110460&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Global; Change; International; Negotiations; Emissions

The purpose of this project is to analyze the strategic aspects of international agreement on the abatement of emissions that cause transboundary pollution. Some researchers have suggested that the problem of obtaining international cooperation has the structure of a prisoners' dilemma game in that all parties would be better off if they cooperated, but any one of them has an incentive to cheat or break the rules. Two important questions are raised about the appropriateness of using the this framework for analyzing international agreements related to pollution problems. One is whether the prisoners' dilemma construct is appropriate in this context. And the second is whether, even if it is, a cooperative solution will not be forthcoming. Cooperation is more likely to occur in a repeated game situations, where the same parties face each other time after time as is often the case with international relations. This research will develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the evolution of cooperation between countries in the area of international abatement control. Such cooperation can emerge via coalitions in a cooperative framework, or by tacit agreements that emerge via trigger strategies in repeated games. Both approaches will be pursued in this project. The notion of a critical coalition is introduced into the theoretical framework which is a coalition of countries agreeing to implement an abatement agreement that has certain stability properties. This project is important because it will produce useful insights into the process of international negotiation on global change, and provide a basis for choosing negotiating frameworks and strategies that will lead to stable and positive outcomes.

该项目的目的是分析关于减少造成跨界污染的排放的国际协定的战略方面。一些研究人员提出，获得国际合作的问题具有囚徒困境博弈的结构，即如果各方合作，各方的境况都会更好，但其中任何一方都有作弊或违反规则的动机。对于使用这一框架分析与污染问题有关的国际协定是否适当，提出了两个重要问题。其一，囚徒困境的概念在这种背景下是否合适。第二个问题是，即使是这样，是否也不会出现合作解决方案。合作更有可能在重复博弈的情况下发生，在这种情况下，相同的各方一次又一次地面对对方，这在国际关系中经常是这样的。这项研究将为分析各国在国际减排控制领域的合作演变提供一个理论框架。这种合作可以通过合作框架中的联盟来实现，也可以通过反复博弈中通过触发策略而出现的默契来实现。这两种方法都将在本项目中采用。在理论框架中引入了关键联盟的概念，即各国同意执行一项具有某些稳定性的减排协定的联盟。这个项目很重要，因为它将对全球变化国际谈判进程产生有益的见解，并为选择谈判框架和战略提供基础，从而导致稳定和积极的结果。