Collaborative Research on Divided Government

分治政府的合作研究

• 批准号: 9111112
• 负责人: Alberto Alesina
• 金额: $ 4.61万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-08-15 至 1994-04-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9111112&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Divided; Government

In western democracies and, in particular, in the United States, policy outcomes are functions of the interaction of the separate executive and legislature. Policy decisions are reflections of the partisan and ideological composition of the two branches. In this context, divided government occurs as a result of voters' desire to create checks and balances by moderating an executive controlled by one party or point of view against a legislature dominated by another party or perspective. This sophisticated research explores several theoretical and empirical issues with respect to the growing trend toward divided government both in the United States and in various other democratic nations. First, the research will examine the effects on presidential candidates of knowing the policy composition of the legislature. Second, the study will consider the effects of divided government on the propensity toward and success of third parties. Third, the possibility that voter turnout may be used as a moderating devise will be explored. Finally, the robustness of the results will be evaluated by examining the dynamics of divided government in other countries, specifically in france. When completed this research should greatly increase our understanding of the causes and consequences of divided government in the United States. It also should and provide valuable information on the operation of institutional checks and balances that will be of use not only in the United States but especially in new democracies as they make decisions about the types of institutions to develop. This is collaborative research with Howard Rosenthal (SES-9111059).

在西方民主国家，特别是美国， 政策结果是各个部门之间相互作用的函数， 行政和立法。 政策决定反映了 两个分支的党派和意识形态组成。 在这 在这种背景下，分裂的政府是选民希望的结果， 通过调节一个被控制的执行官来建立制衡 由一个政党或观点反对立法机构， 另一种观点或观点。 这项复杂的研究探讨了几个理论和 关于日益增长的分化趋势的经验问题 在美国和其他国家， 民主国家。 首先，这项研究将考察 关于总统候选人知道的政策组成， 立法机关 第二，研究将考虑 政府对第三产业的倾向和成功的看法存在分歧 parties. 第三，选民投票率可能被用作 将探索一种缓和的设计。 最后， 结果将通过检查分裂的动力学来评估。 在其他国家，特别是在法国。 这项研究完成后，将大大提高我们的 了解政府分裂的原因和后果 在美国 它还应该提供有价值的 关于机构制衡运作情况的资料 这不仅对美国有用， 在新的民主国家，当他们决定 机构发展。 这是与霍华德罗森塔尔（SES-9111059）的合作研究。