Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Informal exchange and political power

经济学博士论文研究：非正式交换与政治权力

• 批准号: 1156205
• 负责人: Alberto Alesina
• 金额: $ 1.56万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-06-01 至 2013-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1156205&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Informal

This study examines the private benefits enjoyed by political leaders of small jurisdictions in rural China, and the effect of democracy on these benefits. Village leaders in poor settings are often "big shots;" their position affords them social status, kickbacks and other gifts from citizens, the value of which may be large in aggregate. The extent to which democracy can mitigate these private gains by making leaders accountable to citizens is of great interest.This study examines the effects of local democracy by constructing a unique data set on social networks in Chinese villages. In the studied villages, major life events (births, weddings and funerals) are commemorated by large gatherings where gifts are exchanged, and their content is recorded in an account book held by the family. The research project digitizes these account books, spanning gifts given over the last 40 years, and reconstructs the history of the village social and gift network from them. Such detailed, accurate data on historical gift transfers in a poor setting, including to and from village leaders, is very rare to find.The main contribution of the research is to examine the effect of a democratic transition on informal authority. China instituted local elections in all villages between 1985 and 1995. By analyzing data on gifts received and given by politicians and leaders, it is possible to identify the effect of more democratic institutions on the informal power of village authorities. If the democratic transition creates a genuine shift in the source of authority of village leaders (from Communist Party to the citizens of the village), the flow of gifts to leaders should diminish, and leaders should reciprocate gifts further. The study tests whether local democratic institutions are successful in transferring some of leaders' informal power to citizens.In addition, the detailed gift record will allow an in-depth examination of the institutions of reciprocity and gift exchange in a poor rural setting.

本研究考察了中国农村小行政区政治领导人享有的私人利益，以及民主对这些利益的影响。贫困地区的村长往往是“大人物”;他们的地位使他们获得社会地位、回扣和公民的其他礼物，这些礼物的总价值可能很大。民主能在多大程度上通过让领导人对公民负责来减轻这些私人收益是一个很大的兴趣。本研究通过构建一个关于中国村庄社交网络的独特数据集来检验地方民主的影响。在所研究的村庄中，重大的生活事件（出生、婚礼和葬礼）是通过大型聚会来纪念的，在聚会上交换礼物，其内容记录在家庭持有的账簿上。该研究项目将这些账簿数字化，跨越过去40年的礼物，并从中重建村庄社会和礼物网络的历史。这种详细的，准确的数据，在历史上的礼物转让在一个贫穷的环境，包括和村领导，是非常罕见的发现。研究的主要贡献是检查的影响，民主过渡的非正式权威。1985年至1995年，中国在所有农村实行了地方选举。通过分析政治家和领导人接受和赠送礼物的数据，有可能确定更民主的制度对村庄权力机构非正式权力的影响。如果民主转型真正改变了村领导的权威来源（从共产党到村民），那么送给领导人的礼物应该减少，领导人应该进一步回报礼物。这项研究测试了地方民主机构是否成功地将一些领导人的非正式权力转移给公民，此外，详细的礼物记录将使人们能够深入研究贫穷农村环境中的互惠和礼物交换制度。