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Topics in the Economic Analysis of Law

Topics in the Economic Analysis of Law
法律经济分析专题
批准号:
9111947
负责人:
Steven Shavell
金额:
$5.99万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1991
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1991-08-15 至 1994-01-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
在过去十年中,通过对法律规则进行经济分析,在理解法律的作用和功能方面取得了重大进展。特别是在合同关系和侵权行为领域,在各种信息和不确定条件下的理论建模增加了我们对不同规则结构、制裁制度和监管制度的影响和潜在影响的了解。沙维尔博士一直是研究这类问题的知名学者。在这个项目中,Shavell博士通过专注于三个不同的主题来继续这项工作。前两项涉及合同法,涉及(1)关于订立合同时披露信息的规则,以及(2)关于被要约当事人通过收集有关要约价值的信息而依赖要约后撤回要约的能力的规则。最后一个主题涉及(3)规范公司雇员对公司所犯侵权行为或罪行的个人责任的规则。这些主题中的每一个都框定了对法律具有理论和实践重要性的问题。此外,正在进行的工作以更现实的方式模拟情况。虽然已经有模型来分析卖家披露信息的动机,但还没有人研究过普通合同法的影响。同样,合同法也没有对要约和承诺进行严格的经济分析。最后,虽然一般都有威慑的模型,但沙维尔博士通过将企业概念化为一群参与者(每个参与者都有自己的私人激励),而不是单一的统一参与者,增加了重要的现实主义。这种对法律和业务背景的关注本身也很重要,并为其他国家开辟了可供借鉴的研究路线。
英文摘要
Over the last decade there has been substantial progress in understanding the role and functions of law through the economic analysis of legal rules. Especially in the areas of contractual relations and torts, theoretical modelling under various conditions of information and uncertainty has added to our knowledge about the effects and potential effects of differing rule structures, sanctioning systems, and regulatory regimes. Dr. Shavell has been a leading scholar studying such problems. In this project, Dr. Shavell continues that work through focusing on three different topics. The first two, which relate to contract law, address (1) rules governing disclosure of information at the time of contracting, and (2) rules governing a party's ability to withdraw an offer after the party to whom the offer has been made has relied on the offer by gathering information about the offer's value. The final topic addresses (3) rules governing a corporate employee's personal liability for torts or crimes committed by the corporation. Each of these topics frames issues of theoretical and practical importance for law. Also, the work being pursued models situations with increased realism. While there are already models to analyze sellers' incentives to disclose information, none has studied the effects of ordinary contract law. Similarly, there has been no rigorous economic analysis of contract law dealing with offer and acceptance. Finally, while there are models of deterrence generally, Dr. Shavell adds important realism by conceptualizing a business firm as a bundle of actors (each with their own private incentives) rather than as a single unified actor. This attention to law and to operational context is important in its own right and in opening up lines of research for others to follow.
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会议论文
Theoretical Study of the Economics of Law
Theoretical Study of the Economics of Law
The Principal-Agent Relationship in Law and Economics
1977 National Needs Postdoctoral Fellowship Program
  • 批准号:
    7712361
  • 项目类别:
    Fellowship Award
  • 资助金额:
    $1.35万
  • 财政年份:
    1977
  • 负责人:
    Steven Shavell
  • 依托单位:
海外基金