Topics in the Economic Analysis of Law

法律经济分析专题

• 批准号: 9111947
• 负责人: Steven Shavell
• 金额: $ 5.99万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-08-15 至 1994-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9111947&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Topics; Economic; Analysis; Law

Over the last decade there has been substantial progress in understanding the role and functions of law through the economic analysis of legal rules. Especially in the areas of contractual relations and torts, theoretical modelling under various conditions of information and uncertainty has added to our knowledge about the effects and potential effects of differing rule structures, sanctioning systems, and regulatory regimes. Dr. Shavell has been a leading scholar studying such problems. In this project, Dr. Shavell continues that work through focusing on three different topics. The first two, which relate to contract law, address (1) rules governing disclosure of information at the time of contracting, and (2) rules governing a party's ability to withdraw an offer after the party to whom the offer has been made has relied on the offer by gathering information about the offer's value. The final topic addresses (3) rules governing a corporate employee's personal liability for torts or crimes committed by the corporation. Each of these topics frames issues of theoretical and practical importance for law. Also, the work being pursued models situations with increased realism. While there are already models to analyze sellers' incentives to disclose information, none has studied the effects of ordinary contract law. Similarly, there has been no rigorous economic analysis of contract law dealing with offer and acceptance. Finally, while there are models of deterrence generally, Dr. Shavell adds important realism by conceptualizing a business firm as a bundle of actors (each with their own private incentives) rather than as a single unified actor. This attention to law and to operational context is important in its own right and in opening up lines of research for others to follow.

在过去十年中，在以下方面取得了实质性进展： 通过经济学理解法律的作用和功能 法律的规则分析。 特别是在合同领域， 关系和侵权行为，各种条件下的理论模型 信息和不确定性增加了我们对 不同规则结构的影响和潜在影响， 制裁制度和监管制度。 夏维尔医生 研究这类问题的主要学者。 在这个项目中，Shavell博士继续这项工作， 三个不同的主题。 前两个与合同有关 （1）关于在联合国系统披露信息的规则 （2）当事人一方当事人的权利和义务; 在接受要约的一方之后撤回要约 通过收集有关要约的信息来依赖要约 值 最后一个主题涉及（3）公司治理规则 雇员的个人责任的侵权或犯罪所犯的 Corporation. 这些主题中的每一个框架的理论和 法律的实际意义。 此外，正在进行的工作模型 增加现实主义。 虽然已经有模型 分析卖家披露信息的动机， 研究了普通合同法的效力。 同样， 没有严格的经济分析合同法处理 要约和承诺。 最后，虽然有一些模型， 一般来说，威慑，沙维尔博士增加了重要的现实主义， 将企业概念化为一组参与者（每个参与者 他们自己的私人激励），而不是作为一个单一的统一 演员 这种对法律和行动背景的关注 重要的是，在其本身的权利，并开辟研究路线， 其他人跟随。