Theoretical Study of the Economics of Law

在过去的十年中，法律科学研究中最重要的发展之一是在法律和经济学的交叉领域开展工作。在为这一领域做出贡献的人中，Shavell博士因其创新的工作和生产力而受到最尊重。在这个项目中，Shavell博士计划继续并扩展他对法律经济分析的理论研究，以解决一系列问题，其中经济原理可以产生关于法律规则效果和法律相关关系性质的新知识。解决三个问题。主要主题是关于知识产权制度（专利、版权、商标保护）的另一种选择。另一种选择是政府对智力作品的创作给予奖励，然后让这些作品进入公共领域。专利的主要问题是它们造成了垄断，从而导致了高于边际成本的无效定价；另一方面，没有专利（或其他奖励制度）可能会减少个人对创新的回报。将从理论上分析登记和奖励制度与产权保护制度的比较。鉴于生产力、竞争力和技术变革是重要的经济问题，知识产权转让的可能性在提高美国工业生产率和促进美国技术进步方面发挥了重要作用。第二个问题是调查员先前关于最佳制裁和执行成本的工作的延伸。将区分两种类型的执行成本——无论受到制裁的个人数量多少，政府都必须承担的固定成本，以及随着受到制裁或从事有害行为的个人数量增加而增加的可变成本或边际成本。需要探讨的基本观点是，罪犯是否也应该支付被捕的费用。第三个问题，也是研究者之前工作的延伸，考虑了当有非货币结果时的最优激励合同。委托代理关系的经济模型通常假定代理人的行为所产生的风险后果是货币的。这种分析将适用于结果以某种方式影响委托人效用而不是影响其财富的情况，例如律师寻求对客户子女的监护权，或医生寻求治愈病人。这项研究应该增加我们对最优契约的定性方面的理解。

During the past decade, one of the most significant developments in the scientific study of law is work at the intersection of law and economics. Among those who have contributed to this area, Dr. Shavell is among the most respected for his innovative work and productivity. Under this project, Dr. Shavell plans to continue and extend his theoretical research on the economic analysis of law to a set of problems where economic principles can generate new knowledge about the effects of legal rules and the nature of law-related relations. Three problems will be addressed. The major topic concerns an alternative to property rights regimes (patent, copyright, trademark protection) in intellectual works. The alternative is for the government to give rewards for creation of intellectual works and then have the works enter the public domain. The main problem with patents is that they create a monopoly, and hence inefficient pricing above marginal cost; on the other side, not having patents (or another system of reward) may reduce the private returns to innovation. A theoretical analysis will be made of how the registry and reward system compares to a system of protection of property rights. Given that productivity, competitiveness, and technological change are important economic issues, the possibility of assignment of property rights for intellectual works can play an important role in improving productivity of American industry and increasing U.S. technical progress. The second problem is an extension of the investigator's previous work on optimal sanctions and enforcement costs. A distinction will be made between two types of enforcement costs--fixed costs that the government must bear regardless of the number of individuals sanctioned and variable or marginal costs which increase with the number of individuals sanctioned or engaging in harmful acts. The essential idea to be explored is whether the offender should also pay for the cost of being caught. The third problem, also an extension of the investigator's previous work, considers optimal incentive contracts when there are non-monetary outcomes. The economic model of the principal and agent relationship generally assumes that the risky outcome that results from the agent's action is monetary. This analysis will pertain to the case in which the outcome affects the principal's utility in a way other than by affecting his wealth, such as a lawyer seeking custody for a client's children or a physician seeking to cure a patient. This study should increase our understanding about the qualitative aspects of optimal contracts.