Collaborative Research: The Design of Bankruptcy Procedures

决定投资政策、清算政策和财务困境后果的一个关键因素是管理破产的一套规则。破产规则以两种方式影响财务困难的公司。首先，很明显它们会影响破产程序的结果。其次，它们确立了破产外和解的替代方案，从而影响了这类和解的性质。非正式讨价还价和正式破产的可能结果反过来影响投资资金的可用性和股权持有人将追求的投资类型。更具体地说，考虑不周的破产规则可能使投资者无法获得公平的回报，即使在投资在经济上可行的情况下也是如此。此外，破产规则可能会鼓励或阻碍低效投资。最后，破产制度影响企业被迫清算资产的程度，即使资产的“持续经营”价值高于未偿债务。本研究的目的是通过提出基于这些考虑的最优破产法的一些特征来指导围绕破产的政策辩论。该研究方法的新颖之处在于，它将最优破产法视为设计最优金融契约这一更广泛问题的一个要素。这种契约规定了资源如何在投资者和企业之间分配。实际的金融合同通常只规定（可能有条件的）支付给投资者。事实上，关于违反约定的承诺的规则通常没有在合同中明确规定。它们通常包含在法律体系中，是每个合同的隐含组成部分。例如，债务合同规定了债务人的投资，他有权获得的特定付款，以及限制债务人行为的契约。破产法规定了一个程序，如果承诺的付款没有兑现或契约被违反，可以遵循这个程序。考虑到这一问题，将对安全设计进行审查，包括明确的承诺和违约时应遵循的程序，并推导出最优破产规则，作为整个合同设计问题的一部分。

A key factor in determining investment policy, liquidation policy, and the consequences of financial distress is the set of rules governing bankruptcy. Bankruptcy rules affect firms in financial distress in two ways. First, it is obvious that they affect the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding. Second, they establish the alternative to an out-of-bankruptcy settlement and so affect the nature of such settlements. The likely outcomes of both informal bargaining and formal bankruptcy, in turn, affect the availability of funds for investment and the types of investments equity holders will pursue. More specifically, poorly conceived bankruptcy rules may make it impossible for investors to earn a fair return, even in situations where the investment is economically viable. Also, bankruptcy rules may encourage or discourage inefficient investments. Finally the bankruptcy regime affects the extent to which firms are forced to liquidate assets even when the "going concern" value of the assets is higher than the outstanding debt. The purpose of the research is to guide the policy debate surrounding bankruptcy by suggesting some features of an optimal bankruptcy law based on these considerations. The research method is novel in how it regards optimal bankruptcy law as one element in the broader problem of designing optimal financial contracts. Such contracts specify how resources are to be allocated between investors and firms. Actual financial contracts usually stipulate only (possibly contingent) payments to investors. The rules governing the breach of stipulated promises are, in fact, typically not specified in the contract explicitly. They are generally contained in the legal system and are implicitly a part of every contract. For example, debt contracts specify the debtholder's investment, the specific payments to which he is entitled, and covenants restricting the debtor's behavior. Bankruptcy law provides a procedure to be followed if the promised payments are not made or if the covenants are violated. In view of this concern, security design will be examined as including both explicit promises and the procedures to be followed in case of breach, and optimal bankruptcy rules will be derived as part of an overall contract design problem.