Collaborative Research: The Design of Bankruptcy Procedures

合作研究：破产程序的设计

• 批准号: 9209317
• 负责人: Artur Raviv
• 金额: $ 10.26万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1992
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1992-07-15 至 1994-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9209317&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Design; Bankruptcy; Procedures

A key factor in determining investment policy, liquidation policy, and the consequences of financial distress is the set of rules governing bankruptcy. Bankruptcy rules affect firms in financial distress in two ways. First, it is obvious that they affect the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding. Second, they establish the alternative to an out-of-bankruptcy settlement and so affect the nature of such settlements. The likely outcomes of both informal bargaining and formal bankruptcy, in turn, affect the availability of funds for investment and the types of investments equity holders will pursue. More specifically, poorly conceived bankruptcy rules may make it impossible for investors to earn a fair return, even in situations where the investment is economically viable. Also, bankruptcy rules may encourage or discourage inefficient investments. Finally the bankruptcy regime affects the extent to which firms are forced to liquidate assets even when the "going concern" value of the assets is higher than the outstanding debt. The purpose of the research is to guide the policy debate surrounding bankruptcy by suggesting some features of an optimal bankruptcy law based on these considerations. The research method is novel in how it regards optimal bankruptcy law as one element in the broader problem of designing optimal financial contracts. Such contracts specify how resources are to be allocated between investors and firms. Actual financial contracts usually stipulate only (possibly contingent) payments to investors. The rules governing the breach of stipulated promises are, in fact, typically not specified in the contract explicitly. They are generally contained in the legal system and are implicitly a part of every contract. For example, debt contracts specify the debtholder's investment, the specific payments to which he is entitled, and covenants restricting the debtor's behavior. Bankruptcy law provides a procedure to be followed if the promised payments are not made or if the covenants are violated. In view of this concern, security design will be examined as including both explicit promises and the procedures to be followed in case of breach, and optimal bankruptcy rules will be derived as part of an overall contract design problem.

决定投资政策、清算政策和财务困境后果的一个关键因素是一套管理破产的规则。破产规则对陷入财务困境的公司有两方面的影响。首先，它们显然会影响破产程序的结果。其次，它们建立了破产外和解的替代方案，因此影响了此类和解的性质。非正式讨价还价和正式破产的可能结果反过来又会影响可用于投资的资金和股权持有人将追求的投资类型。更具体地说，糟糕的破产规则可能会使投资者无法获得公平回报，即使在投资在经济上可行的情况下也是如此。此外，破产规则可能会鼓励或阻止低效投资。最后，即使资产的“持续经营”价值高于未偿债务，破产制度也会影响企业被迫清算资产的程度。这项研究的目的是通过提出基于这些考虑因素的最优破产法的一些特征来指导围绕破产的政策辩论。这一研究方法的创新之处在于，它如何将最优破产法视为设计最优金融合同这一更广泛问题的一个要素。这类合同规定了如何在投资者和公司之间分配资源。实际的金融合同通常只规定(可能是或有)向投资者付款。事实上，合同中通常没有明确规定违反约定承诺的规则。它们通常包含在法律体系中，并隐含地成为每一份合同的一部分。例如，债务合同规定了债务持有人的投资、他有权获得的具体付款，以及约束债务人行为的契约。破产法规定了一个程序，如果承诺的付款没有得到支付或如果违反了公约，则应遵循的程序。有鉴于此，证券设计将被视为既包括明确的承诺，也包括违约时应遵循的程序，并将作为整体合同设计问题的一部分，推导出最优破产规则。