Recruiting by Employers...Implications for Labor Market Behavior and Policy

雇主使用不同的招聘机制， 分为两大类。 对于某些工作， 一旦职位空缺，第一个出现的合格人员。 这通常确保工人将接受工作，如果它 公寓距离 对于其他工作，雇主投入更多的时间 消费过程，通常通过以下方式接受初始申请 信箱 这意味着申请人更有可能获得 在申请期间提供的替代方案 审查，并可能拒绝一份工作。 这样做的目的 研究是分析昂贵的雇主的经济影响， 在这两个制度框架下进行研究。 该项目 三个目标。 一是加强理论建设 通过扩展现有模型来理解雇主搜索， 考虑到工人的异质性和动态因素。 的 二是分析特定劳动力市场的影响 最低工资法、非技术移民等政策 就业和失业保险问题 扩展的理论模型 最后，对模型进行了检验， 研究它们对招聘广告的影响。 本研究 很重要，因为它将为工作提供新的见解 匹配过程

Employers use different recruiting mechanisms that can be classified in two broad categories. For some jobs, firms hire the first qualified person to show up once a job becomes vacant. This generally ensures that the worker will accept the job if it is offered. For other jobs, employers engage in a more time consuming process, often accepting initial applications through the mail. This means that applicants are more likely to get alternative offers during the period that applications are reviewed and may turn down a job offer. The purpose of this research is to analyze the economic effects of costly employer search under these two institutional frameworks. The project has three objectives. The first is to strengthen our theoretical understanding of employer search by extending existing models to account for worker heterogeneity and dynamic considerations. The second is to the analyze the effects of certain labor market policies like minimum wage laws, the immigration of unskilled workers, and unemployment insurance in the context of the extended theoretical models. Finally, the models are tested by examining their implications for job-advertising. This research is important because it will shed new insights into the job matching process.