Recruiting by Employers...Implications for Labor Market Behavior and Policy

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Employers use different recruiting mechanisms that can be classified in two broad categories. For some jobs, firms hire the first qualified person to show up once a job becomes vacant. This generally ensures that the worker will accept the job if it is offered. For other jobs, employers engage in a more time consuming process, often accepting initial applications through the mail. This means that applicants are more likely to get alternative offers during the period that applications are reviewed and may turn down a job offer. The purpose of this research is to analyze the economic effects of costly employer search under these two institutional frameworks. The project has three objectives. The first is to strengthen our theoretical understanding of employer search by extending existing models to account for worker heterogeneity and dynamic considerations. The second is to the analyze the effects of certain labor market policies like minimum wage laws, the immigration of unskilled workers, and unemployment insurance in the context of the extended theoretical models. Finally, the models are tested by examining their implications for job-advertising. This research is important because it will shed new insights into the job matching process.