Recruiting by Employers...Implications for Labor Market Behavior and Policy

雇主使用不同的招聘机制，可以分为两大类。对于一些职位，一旦职位空缺，公司会雇佣第一个合格的人。这通常可以确保员工接受工作机会。而对于其他工作，雇主则需要花费更多的时间，通常会通过邮件接受初次申请。这意味着申请人在审查申请期间更有可能获得其他工作机会，并可能拒绝工作机会。本研究的目的是分析在这两个制度框架下昂贵的雇主寻找的经济效应。该项目有三个目标。首先，通过扩展现有模型来考虑工人异质性和动态因素，加强我们对雇主寻找的理论理解。二是在扩展理论模型的背景下，分析某些劳动力市场政策的影响，如最低工资法、非熟练工人的移民和失业保险。最后，通过考察这些模型对招聘广告的影响来检验这些模型。这项研究很重要，因为它将为工作匹配过程提供新的见解。

Employers use different recruiting mechanisms that can be classified in two broad categories. For some jobs, firms hire the first qualified person to show up once a job becomes vacant. This generally ensures that the worker will accept the job if it is offered. For other jobs, employers engage in a more time consuming process, often accepting initial applications through the mail. This means that applicants are more likely to get alternative offers during the period that applications are reviewed and may turn down a job offer. The purpose of this research is to analyze the economic effects of costly employer search under these two institutional frameworks. The project has three objectives. The first is to strengthen our theoretical understanding of employer search by extending existing models to account for worker heterogeneity and dynamic considerations. The second is to the analyze the effects of certain labor market policies like minimum wage laws, the immigration of unskilled workers, and unemployment insurance in the context of the extended theoretical models. Finally, the models are tested by examining their implications for job-advertising. This research is important because it will shed new insights into the job matching process.