Collaborative Research on Reputation and Bargaining

9310068阿布瑞乌贸易和交换活动是经济学的基础，然而，直到最近，关于最纯粹的贸易形式--即双边讨价还价--的研究还很少。大约10年前的一项研究突破导致了大量关于这一主题的论文，所有这些论文都以无数种不同的形式强调了讨价还价者相对急于达成协议的作用，以及讨价还价过程的确切协议。这一理论在产业组织、国际贸易与金融、政治经济学、宏观经济学等领域得到了广泛而有效的应用。这个项目从一个新的角度重新审视了这个基本问题，并用对对手战略姿态的轻微不确定性取代了旧理论提供之间的轻微不耐烦。也就是说，另一个玩家可能是许多“非理性”类型中的一个，概率很小。简单地说，这个信息是这样的：讨价还价与其说是关于轻微的不耐烦，不如说是关于报价和还价的确切协议；相反，它是由各种虚张声势和装腔作势等因素驱动的。本着这种精神，开发的模型强调声誉效应，因果经验主义和个人反省都表明，声誉效应在讨价还价中很重要。到目前为止，这种方法看起来很有前途，一些简单的案例已经被完整地分析了。该项目将把这些初步结果推广到更一般的环境中。如上所述，早期的讨价还价模式已经在许多领域得到了卓有成效的应用；基于声誉的讨价还价模式可能也会同样有用。***

9310068 Abreu The activities of trade and exchange are fundamental to economics, yet, until very recently, there was little research on perhaps the most pure form of trading, i.e., bilateral bargaining. A research breakthrough, about a decade ago, led to a flood of papers on this topic, all of which emphasized in myriad variations, the role of the relative slight impatience of bargainers to come to agreement, and the precise protocol of the bargaining process. This theory has been widely and usefully applied in a variety of fields, including industrial organization, international trade and finance, political economy, macroeconomics, and so on. This project readdresses this basic question from a new perspective and replaces the slight impatience between offers of the old theory with slight uncertainty about the strategic posture of one's opponent. That is, with small probability the other player may be one of many "irrational" types. The message very crudely put is this: Bargaining isn't so much about slight impatience and the exact protocol of offers and counteroffers; rather, it is driven by such factors as bluffing and posturing of various sorts. In this spirit, the model developed stresses reputational effects which both causal empiricism and personal introspection suggest are important in bargaining. So far this approach seems very promising, and some simple cases have been completely analyzed. This project will extend these preliminary results to more general settings. As noted, the earlier bargaining models have been fruitfully applied in many areas; a reputation-based bargaining paradigm will be potentially as useful. ***