Collaborative Research on Reputation and Bargaining

小行星9310068 贸易和交换活动是经济学的基础，然而，直到最近，几乎没有研究可能是最纯粹的贸易形式，即，双边谈判。 大约10年前，一项研究取得了突破性进展，导致关于这一主题的论文如潮水般涌现，所有这些论文都以各种各样的形式强调了讨价还价者达成协议的相对轻微的不耐烦所起的作用，以及讨价还价过程的精确协议。 这一理论在产业组织、国际贸易与金融、政治经济学、宏观经济学等领域得到了广泛而有效的应用。 这个项目从一个新的角度重新审视这个基本问题，用对对手战略态势的轻微不确定性取代了旧理论提供之间的轻微不耐烦。 也就是说，在很小的概率下，另一个参与者可能是许多“非理性”类型之一。 这个信息非常粗略地说是这样的：讨价还价并不是关于轻微的不耐烦和提供和还价的确切协议;相反，它是由诸如虚张声势和各种姿态等因素驱动的。 在这种精神下，该模型强调声誉的影响，这两个因果关系的自我反省和建议是重要的讨价还价。 到目前为止，这种方法似乎很有前途，并已完全分析了一些简单的情况。 本项目将把这些初步结果扩展到更一般的设置。 如前所述，早期的谈判模型已在许多领域得到了卓有成效的应用;基于声誉的谈判范式也可能同样有用。 ***

9310068 Abreu The activities of trade and exchange are fundamental to economics, yet, until very recently, there was little research on perhaps the most pure form of trading, i.e., bilateral bargaining. A research breakthrough, about a decade ago, led to a flood of papers on this topic, all of which emphasized in myriad variations, the role of the relative slight impatience of bargainers to come to agreement, and the precise protocol of the bargaining process. This theory has been widely and usefully applied in a variety of fields, including industrial organization, international trade and finance, political economy, macroeconomics, and so on. This project readdresses this basic question from a new perspective and replaces the slight impatience between offers of the old theory with slight uncertainty about the strategic posture of one's opponent. That is, with small probability the other player may be one of many "irrational" types. The message very crudely put is this: Bargaining isn't so much about slight impatience and the exact protocol of offers and counteroffers; rather, it is driven by such factors as bluffing and posturing of various sorts. In this spirit, the model developed stresses reputational effects which both causal empiricism and personal introspection suggest are important in bargaining. So far this approach seems very promising, and some simple cases have been completely analyzed. This project will extend these preliminary results to more general settings. As noted, the earlier bargaining models have been fruitfully applied in many areas; a reputation-based bargaining paradigm will be potentially as useful. ***