Collaborative Research: Bargaining and Behavioral Pertubations in Repeated Games

通过达成自我执行的协议，处于持续战略状态的代理人创造了对双方都有利的盈余。对于盈余将如何分配，人们知之甚少。这个项目涉及声誉形成在这样的环境中的作用。它研究了一个模型，在这个模型中，玩家考虑到他们的对手可能受到各种行为偏见的微小可能性。令人高兴的是，这些信息复杂性似乎使得预测重复游戏中通常会发生什么变得更容易。出现了在重复博弈中讨价还价的理论，加强了合作博弈和非合作博弈理论之间的一些联系。该建议还讨论了动态博弈，在动态博弈中，不同的博弈阶段由资本存量或库存等“状态变量”联系在一起。在这里，人们可以研究产业组织中的一些最重要的问题，包括面对潜在进入时的串通。其中一个目标是推导出可应用于动态博弈的“有威胁的纳什讨价还价解决方案”的一般形式。

By arriving at self-enforcing agreements, agents in an ongoing strategic situation create surplus that benefits them both. Little is known about how that surplus will be divided. This project concerns the role of reputation formation in such environments. It studies a model in which players entertain the slight possibility that their opponents may be subject to a variety of behavioral biases. Happily, it seems that these informational complications make it easier to predict what will usually happen in the repeated game. There emerges a theory of bargaining in repeated games that strengthens some links between cooperative games and noncooperative game theory.The proposal also addresses dynamic games, in which the different periods of play are con-nected by "state variables" such as capital stock or inventories. Here one can examine some of the most important problems in industrial organization, including collusion in the face of potential entry. One of the goals is to derive a generalization of the "Nash bargaining solution with threats" that can be applied in dynamic games.