Collaborative Research: Bargaining and Behavioral Pertubations in Repeated Games

通过达成自我执行的协议，处于持续战略局势中的代理人创造了对双方都有利的盈余。 至于这笔盈余将如何分配，人们知之甚少。这个项目关注的是在这样的环境中声誉形成的作用。 它研究的是一个模型，在这个模型中，玩家考虑到他们的对手可能会受到各种行为偏见的影响。 令人高兴的是，这些复杂的信息似乎使预测重复游戏中通常会发生的事情变得更容易。 出现了一种重复博弈中的讨价还价理论，这种理论加强了合作博弈与非合作博弈理论之间的某些联系，该提议还涉及动态博弈，在动态博弈中，不同的博弈阶段由资本存量或库存等"状态变量"联系起来。 在这里，我们可以研究产业组织中的一些最重要的问题，包括面对潜在进入的共谋。 其中一个目标是得到一个泛化的“纳什讨价还价的解决方案与威胁”，可以应用于动态博弈。

By arriving at self-enforcing agreements, agents in an ongoing strategic situation create surplus that benefits them both. Little is known about how that surplus will be divided. This project concerns the role of reputation formation in such environments. It studies a model in which players entertain the slight possibility that their opponents may be subject to a variety of behavioral biases. Happily, it seems that these informational complications make it easier to predict what will usually happen in the repeated game. There emerges a theory of bargaining in repeated games that strengthens some links between cooperative games and noncooperative game theory.The proposal also addresses dynamic games, in which the different periods of play are con-nected by "state variables" such as capital stock or inventories. Here one can examine some of the most important problems in industrial organization, including collusion in the face of potential entry. One of the goals is to derive a generalization of the "Nash bargaining solution with threats" that can be applied in dynamic games.