Collaborative Research: Reputational Equilibrium Refinements of Bargaining Games with Asymmetric Information
合作研究:不对称信息讨价还价博弈的声誉均衡细化
基本信息
- 批准号:1357907
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 6.9万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Standard Grant
- 财政年份:2014
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:2014-07-01 至 2016-06-30
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
Bargaining between two agents is one of the most central economic problems, and it often occurs under asymmetric information: one or more of the agents lack some relevant information about the opponent (how she weighs current versus future consumption, how much she values some commodity to be exchanged, what other options she might have, and so on). Despite the importance of this problem, it resists traditional economic analysis, and economists do not view the models currently available as offering adequate treatments of the subject. This proposal studies a number of bargaining situations when players have the possibility of building reputations for being "tough". We hope to show that in the case of one-sided asymmetric information about a player?s patience, very modest assumptions suffice to produce strong predictions about behavior. Turning to one-sided asymmetric information about valuations, the goal is to allow for a rich variety of behavioral perturbations and still obtain strong conclusions. We hope that the results of this research will ultimately help in the study of two-sided asymmetric information: neither player is sure about how much the other values an object to be sold, for example. The literature offers virtually no guidance about what to expect in such situations and this proposal moves research toward areas considered impenetrable by generations of researchers. The broader impact of the proposal rests on the potential for the results to be applied to real-world bargaining situations. The economic and political landscapes are littered with important examples, from collective bargaining between union and firm to negotiations between a country and its neighbor regarding timber, pipelines, tariffs, or defense accords. Understanding the basic underlying principles would improve our ability to predict outcomes, and to design policies and institutions to promote more favorable results.
两个代理人之间的讨价还价是最核心的经济问题之一,它经常发生在信息不对称的情况下:一个或多个代理人缺乏关于对手的一些相关信息(她如何权衡当前和未来的消费,她对要交换的商品有多重视,她可能有什么其他选择,等等)。尽管这个问题很重要,但它抵制传统的经济分析,经济学家不认为目前可用的模型对这个问题提供了足够的处理。这个提议研究了一些讨价还价的情况下,球员有可能建立声誉的“坚韧”。我们希望表明,在片面的关于一个球员的信息不对称的情况下?如果你有耐心,非常适度的假设就足以产生关于行为的强有力的预测。转向关于估值的单侧不对称信息,目标是允许各种各样的行为扰动,仍然获得强有力的结论。我们希望这项研究的结果最终将有助于研究双边信息不对称:例如,任何一个参与者都不确定对方对要出售的物品的价值。文献几乎没有提供关于在这种情况下会发生什么的指导,这一建议将研究推向了几代研究人员认为无法渗透的领域。该提案的更广泛影响取决于将结果应用于现实世界讨价还价情况的可能性。经济和政治领域充斥着重要的例子,从工会和企业之间的集体谈判到一国与邻国之间关于木材、管道、关税或国防协议的谈判。理解这些基本原理将提高我们预测结果的能力,并设计政策和制度以促进更有利的结果。
项目成果
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Dilip Abreu其他文献
A RESPONSE TO GLAZER AND ROSENTHAL
对格雷泽和罗森塔尔的回应
- DOI:
10.2307/2951529 - 发表时间:
1992 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:6.1
- 作者:
Dilip Abreu;Hitoshi Matsushima - 通讯作者:
Hitoshi Matsushima
Markov Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks
网络讨价还价模型中的马尔可夫均衡
- DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.004 - 发表时间:
2011 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Dilip Abreu;Mihai Manea - 通讯作者:
Mihai Manea
Comments on the Risk and Time Preferences in Economics
经济学中的风险与时间偏好评论
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2002 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
A. Rubinstein;Dilip Abreu;K. Eliaz;Martin Osbrone;Michele Piccione;Uzi Segal;Marciano M. Siniscalchi;R. Spiegler - 通讯作者:
R. Spiegler
A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games
重复博弈中重新谈判的视角
- DOI:
10.1007/978-3-662-07365-0_4 - 发表时间:
1991 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Dilip Abreu;David Pearce - 通讯作者:
David Pearce
Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: complete information
迭代非支配策略中的虚拟实现:完整信息
- DOI:
10.2307/2951536 - 发表时间:
1992 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:6.1
- 作者:
Dilip Abreu;Hitoshi Matsushima - 通讯作者:
Hitoshi Matsushima
Dilip Abreu的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('Dilip Abreu', 18)}}的其他基金
Collaborative Research: Network Formation and Bargaining with Exclusionary Commitments
合作研究:网络的形成和排他性承诺的讨价还价
- 批准号:
2049736 - 财政年份:2021
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: New Algorithms for Computing Equilibria of Stochastic Games
合作研究:计算随机博弈均衡的新算法
- 批准号:
1756215 - 财政年份:2017
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: New Algorithms for Computing Equilibria of Stochastic Games
合作研究:计算随机博弈均衡的新算法
- 批准号:
1530774 - 财政年份:2015
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Algorithms for Computing the Equilibrium Payoff Sets of Dynamic Games with Perfect Monitoring
具有完美监控的动态博弈均衡支付集计算算法
- 批准号:
1124043 - 财政年份:2011
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Reputational Bargaining with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information About Fundamentals
合作研究:基于双方基本面信息不对称的声誉讨价还价
- 批准号:
0922125 - 财政年份:2009
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Bargaining and Reputation in Stochastic Games
合作研究:随机博弈中的讨价还价和声誉
- 批准号:
0751565 - 财政年份:2008
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Models with Behavioral Perturbations
合作研究:解决具有行为扰动的动态模型中的不确定性
- 批准号:
0417902 - 财政年份:2004
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: Bargaining and Behavioral Pertubations in Repeated Games
合作研究:重复博弈中的讨价还价和行为扰动
- 批准号:
0003693 - 财政年份:2000
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research on Reputation and Bargaining
声誉与讨价还价的合作研究
- 批准号:
9696155 - 财政年份:1995
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research on Reputation and Bargaining
声誉与讨价还价的合作研究
- 批准号:
9310068 - 财政年份:1993
- 资助金额:
$ 6.9万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
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