Doctoral Dissertation: Electoral Systems and Intra-Party Organization

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9423786 Powell This Doctoral Dissertation Research Award supports a project that uses both game-theoretic modeling and empirical analysis to investigate how various aspects of electoral systems shape the way in which individuals choose to organize themselves into political parties with particular organizational structures. The theoretical model relates specific electoral rules (e.g. plurality - "winner take all" rules), threshold requirements, and district magnitudes (e.g. multi-member) to the organizational structures rational self-interested individuals choose to adopt. By varying these components of the electoral system, it is possible, within the theoretical model, to generate hypotheses about how intra-party organization will differ under different electoral systems. The empirical analysis seeks to test the hypotheses generated from the theoretical model using three different data sources and methodologies. These include a statistical analysis of a large data set on electoral systems and party organizations for the post war democracies; the analysis of approximately 30 "quasi- experiments" drawn from actual instances of electoral system change; and an in-depth case study exploring the responses of the Italian parties to the recent transformation of their electoral system. ***