Doctoral Dissertation: Electoral Systems and Intra-Party Organization

博士论文：选举制度与党内组织

• 批准号: 9423786
• 负责人: G. Bingham Powell
• 金额: $ 0.82万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1995-02-15 至 1995-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9423786&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Electoral; Systems; Intra

9423786 Powell This Doctoral Dissertation Research Award supports a project that uses both game-theoretic modeling and empirical analysis to investigate how various aspects of electoral systems shape the way in which individuals choose to organize themselves into political parties with particular organizational structures. The theoretical model relates specific electoral rules (e.g. plurality - "winner take all" rules), threshold requirements, and district magnitudes (e.g. multi-member) to the organizational structures rational self-interested individuals choose to adopt. By varying these components of the electoral system, it is possible, within the theoretical model, to generate hypotheses about how intra-party organization will differ under different electoral systems. The empirical analysis seeks to test the hypotheses generated from the theoretical model using three different data sources and methodologies. These include a statistical analysis of a large data set on electoral systems and party organizations for the post war democracies; the analysis of approximately 30 "quasi- experiments" drawn from actual instances of electoral system change; and an in-depth case study exploring the responses of the Italian parties to the recent transformation of their electoral system. ***

小行星9423786 该博士论文研究奖支持一个项目，该项目使用博弈论建模和实证分析来研究选举制度的各个方面如何塑造个人选择将自己组织成具有特定组织结构的政党的方式。 理论模型涉及具体的选举规则（如多元化-“赢家通吃”的规则），门槛要求，和地区的规模（如多成员）的组织结构，理性的自我利益的个人选择采用。 通过改变选举制度的这些组成部分，有可能在理论模型中产生关于党内组织在不同选举制度下如何不同的假设。 实证分析试图使用三种不同的数据来源和方法来测试理论模型产生的假设。 其中包括对战后民主国家选举制度和政党组织的大量数据集的统计分析;从选举制度变化的实际情况中得出的大约30个“准实验”的分析;以及深入的案例研究，探讨意大利政党对其选举制度最近转型的反应。 ***