Strategic Position Taking and the Timing of Voting Decisions in Congress

SBR - 9515075 Box-Steffensmeier 本项目通过研究美国参议院和众议院代表的选择时间来研究立法会议中的战略立场。 这项研究之所以重要，有三个原因：它增加了关于决策背景和顺序的信息;它更接近成员的战略考虑;过程成为分析的焦点，而不是最终结果。 对立法者投票选择时机的研究应该提供对立法者战略行为、对成员的制度约束和利益集团影响战略等理论问题的深入了解。 该项目审查了五个案例研究，包括国会对北美自由贸易协定的投票，北美自由贸易协定被称为“自柏林墙倒塌以来国会山最重要的投票”。 该项目还有一个重要的方法组成部分。 它将开发和应用一个人口分类风险模型。 这个模型将允许研究人员分别估计投票选择的决定因素和投票选择时间的决定因素的影响。 * * *

SBR - 9515075 Box-Steffensmeier This project investigates strategic position taking in legislative assemblies by studying the timing of choices that representatives make in the U.S. Senate and House. This study is important for three reasons: it adds information on the context and sequence of decision making; it more closely approximates members' strategic considerations; and the process becomes the focus of analysis rather than the final result. Research into the timing of legislator vote choices should provide insight into theoretical questions on the strategic behavior of legislators, institutional constraints on members, and strategies of interest group influence. The project examines five case studies including the congressional vote on NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement called "the most important vote on Capitol Hill since the Berlin Wall came down". The project also has an important methodological component. It will develop and apply a split population hazards model. This model will allow researchers to estimate separately the effects of the determinants of vote choice from the determinants of the timing of vote choice. * * *