Formal Models of Sequential Voting and Sequential Elections

顺序投票和顺序选举的正式模型

• 批准号: 9618231
• 负责人: Mark Fey
• 金额: $ 3.96万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-07-01 至 1998-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9618231&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Formal; Models; Sequential; Voting; Elections

Beginning with the works of Anthony Downs (1957) and Duncan Black (1958), a large literature on voting in mass elections and voting in committees has developed that uses the mathematical tools of game theory to enhance our understanding of politics. As these political events are often conducted by secret ballot, it is not surprising that this work on spatial models of voting has taken as given that voters cast their ballots simultaneously. With a secret ballot, the order in which votes are cast is irrelevant because the last voter has no more information about the other ballots than the first voter. However, several important types of elections are sequential in nature; later voters can observe the votes or election results of earlier voters. This proposal investigates the effect that these informational differences have on the behavior of voters who are late in the voting sequence. This research develops a formal model in which voters start with private information about the quality of the candidates. Voters can supplement this information with inferences drawn from earlier votes in the sequence. Several extensions of this model are developed that capture some of the unique features of the presidential nominating process.

从安东尼·唐斯（Anthony Downs，1957）和邓肯·布莱克（Duncan Black，1958）的著作开始，大量关于群众选举投票和委员会投票的文献已经发展起来，这些文献使用博弈论的数学工具来增强我们对政治的理解。 由于这些政治事件通常是通过无记名投票进行的，因此，这一关于投票空间模型的工作被视为选民同时投票也就不足为奇了。 在无记名投票中，投票的顺序是无关紧要的，因为最后一个投票人比第一个投票人对其他选票没有更多的信息。 然而，有几种重要的选举是连续性的;后来的选民可以观察到先前选民的投票或选举结果。 这项建议调查的影响，这些信息的差异对选民谁是晚在投票序列的行为。 本研究发展了一个正式的模型，在该模型中，选民从关于候选人质量的私人信息开始。 投票者可以用从序列中较早的投票中得出的推论来补充这一信息。 这个模型的几个扩展开发，捕捉总统提名过程的一些独特的功能。