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Party and State Management of the Soviet Administrative - Command Economy

Party and State Management of the Soviet Administrative - Command Economy
苏联行政指挥经济的党和国家管理
批准号:
9618944
负责人:
Paul Gregory
金额:
$24.47万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1997
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1997-04-15 至 2002-03-31

项目摘要

项目成果

Paul Gregory的其他基金

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中文摘要
翻译
The Soviet administrative-command economy was the greatest social science experiment of this century. The dismantling of this system will be the greatest economic and political challenge of the next quarter century. It is therefore important to understand this system before it disappears or threatens to return. The purpose of this research is to study the working arrangements of the Soviet administrative-command economy from the 1930s to 1991 using the newly accessible archives of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the archives of its associated party and state organizations, personal archives of Party and state leaders, and more than 60 accumulated interviews with Soviet economic administrators conducted by the PI at the end of the Soviet period. This research uses theories of information economics, public choice, and theories of bureaucracy to study high-level decision making in the Soviet administrative-command economy. It addresses the fundamental issue of the viability of the administrative command economy raised by Hayek and Mises in the 1920s. It is one of the first in-depth studies of working arrangements above the level of the Soviet enterprise. It would be the first to use the actual records of the highest echelons of the Soviet Party and State to describe how and how well the Soviet administrative-command economy worked. This project seeks to answer a number of research questions: How the top Soviet leadership dealt with the greater concentration of information at the periphery, how planners' preferences were formed, the quality of information upon which high-level decisions were based, the size of the party's apparatus, the use of monetary versus physical targets, the formation of interest groups, the toleration of criticism and dissent, principal/agent problems and identification of the levels at which agents can be distinguished from principals, the factors behind the choice of radical reform in the 1980s, and risk avoidance behavior.
英文摘要
The Soviet administrative-command economy was the greatest social science experiment of this century. The dismantling of this system will be the greatest economic and political challenge of the next quarter century. It is therefore important to understand this system before it disappears or threatens to return. The purpose of this research is to study the working arrangements of the Soviet administrative-command economy from the 1930s to 1991 using the newly accessible archives of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the archives of its associated party and state organizations, personal archives of Party and state leaders, and more than 60 accumulated interviews with Soviet economic administrators conducted by the PI at the end of the Soviet period. This research uses theories of information economics, public choice, and theories of bureaucracy to study high-level decision making in the Soviet administrative-command economy. It addresses the fundamental issue of the viability of the administrative command economy raised by Hayek and Mises in the 1920s. It is one of the first in-depth studies of working arrangements above the level of the Soviet enterprise. It would be the first to use the actual records of the highest echelons of the Soviet Party and State to describe how and how well the Soviet administrative-command economy worked. This project seeks to answer a number of research questions: How the top Soviet leadership dealt with the greater concentration of information at the periphery, how planners' preferences were formed, the quality of information upon which high-level decisions were based, the size of the party's apparatus, the use of monetary versus physical targets, the formation of interest groups, the toleration of criticism and dissent, principal/agent problems and identification of the levels at which agents can be distinguished from principals, the factors behind the choice of radical reform in the 1980s, and risk avoidance behavior.
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The Political Economy of Repression: Stalin and His Organs of State Security
  • 批准号:
    0621353
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2006
  • 负责人:
    Paul Gregory
  • 依托单位:
High-Level Decision Making in the Contemporary Soviet Economy
  • 批准号:
    9023338
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $10.8万
  • 财政年份:
    1991
  • 负责人:
    Paul Gregory
  • 依托单位:
Soviet Economic Performance During Period of New Economic Policy, 1921-1928
  • 批准号:
    8813600
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $8.92万
  • 财政年份:
    1988
  • 负责人:
    Paul Gregory
  • 依托单位:
Economic Growth and Performance, Russia and the Soviet Union
  • 批准号:
    7718069
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $7.11万
  • 财政年份:
    1978
  • 负责人:
    Paul Gregory
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
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  • 批准号:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    --
  • 资助金额:
    40万元
  • 批准年份:
    2020
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位:
Cortical control of internal state in the insular cortex-claustrum region
微波有源Scattering dark state粒子的理论及应用研究
  • 批准号:
    61701437
  • 项目类别:
    青年科学基金项目
  • 资助金额:
    28.0万元
  • 批准年份:
    2017
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位: