Party and State Management of the Soviet Administrative - Command Economy

苏联的行政命令经济是本世纪最伟大的社会科学实验。这一体系的瓦解将是未来25年最大的经济和政治挑战。因此，在这一系统消失或有卷土重来的危险之前了解它是很重要的。本研究的目的是利用新获得的中共中央政治局档案、与之相关的党和国家组织档案、党和国家领导人的个人档案，以及PI在苏联末期对苏联经济管理人员进行的60多次访谈，研究20世纪30年代至1991年苏联行政命令经济的工作安排。本研究运用信息经济学理论、公共选择理论和官僚主义理论对苏联行政命令经济中的高层决策进行了研究。它解决了哈耶克和米塞斯在20世纪20年代提出的行政命令经济可行性的基本问题。这是对苏联企业以上工作安排的第一次深入研究。这将是第一次使用苏联党和国家最高阶层的实际记录来描述苏联行政命令经济是如何以及如何运作的。这个项目试图回答一些研究问题：苏联最高领导层如何处理周边地区信息更加集中的情况，计划者的偏好是如何形成的，高层决策所依据的信息质量，党的机构的规模，货币目标与实物目标的使用，利益集团的形成，对批评和异议的容忍，委托人/代理人问题，以及区分代理人和委托人的级别，20世纪80年代激进改革选择背后的因素，以及风险规避行为。

The Soviet administrative-command economy was the greatest social science experiment of this century. The dismantling of this system will be the greatest economic and political challenge of the next quarter century. It is therefore important to understand this system before it disappears or threatens to return. The purpose of this research is to study the working arrangements of the Soviet administrative-command economy from the 1930s to 1991 using the newly accessible archives of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the archives of its associated party and state organizations, personal archives of Party and state leaders, and more than 60 accumulated interviews with Soviet economic administrators conducted by the PI at the end of the Soviet period. This research uses theories of information economics, public choice, and theories of bureaucracy to study high-level decision making in the Soviet administrative-command economy. It addresses the fundamental issue of the viability of the administrative command economy raised by Hayek and Mises in the 1920s. It is one of the first in-depth studies of working arrangements above the level of the Soviet enterprise. It would be the first to use the actual records of the highest echelons of the Soviet Party and State to describe how and how well the Soviet administrative-command economy worked. This project seeks to answer a number of research questions: How the top Soviet leadership dealt with the greater concentration of information at the periphery, how planners' preferences were formed, the quality of information upon which high-level decisions were based, the size of the party's apparatus, the use of monetary versus physical targets, the formation of interest groups, the toleration of criticism and dissent, principal/agent problems and identification of the levels at which agents can be distinguished from principals, the factors behind the choice of radical reform in the 1980s, and risk avoidance behavior.