Markets and Institutions: A Matching Approach

市场和机构：匹配方法

• 批准号: 9630270
• 负责人: Garey Ramey
• 金额: $ 13.98万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1996
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1996-11-01 至 1999-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9630270&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Markets; Institutions; Matching; Approach

Ramey 9630270 Economists have long been concerned with the tradeoffs between market and nonmarket institutions with respect to carrying out transactions. The proposed research breaks new ground by explicitly analyzing the impact of market interaction on the determination and performance of agent-specific trading institutions, based on three key hypotheses: (1) forming productive relationships requires that agents meet with other agents in a matching process that reflects market interaction; (2) newly-matched agents make investments that are specific to their relationship and that cannot be contracted upon explicitly; and (3) productive relationships continue through time and require ongoing effort that is also not contractible. The key insight is that market forces shape trading relationships through their effect on the agents' incentives to provide ongoing effort. The research develops a mathematical general-equilibrium framework consisting of (1) models of bilateral investment and trading under a variety of organizational forms; (2) a matching model reflecting possibilities for asymmetries, search effort and inflow of new agents; and (3) a model of the capital market in which agents obtain resources needed for specific investment as well as creation of new productive assets. This develops a preliminary version of the framework, and reports a range of new analytical results illustrating the power of the approach. First, market forces can counteract the underinvestment incentive deriving from incomplete contractibility of investment, and first-best efficiency can emerge at a positive level of market friction. second, reducing market friction can have adverse short-run welfare effects by destabilizing existing trading relationships, and such reductions can also minimize long-run welfare. Third, market forces affect agents choice of integrated versus nonintegrated organizational forms. The project studies organizational form, matching, renegotiation and welfare in settings characteri zed by uncertainty and/or incomplete information regarding the quality of productive relationships, as well as applications to issues in macroeconomics, including economic growth, policy propagation and nominal rigidity.

Ramey 9630270 长期以来，经济学家一直关注市场和非市场机构在交易过程中的权衡。 该研究基于三个关键假设，明确分析了市场互动对特定代理人交易制度的决定和绩效的影响，从而开辟了新的领域：（1）形成生产性关系需要代理人在反映市场互动的匹配过程中与其他代理人会面;（2）新配对的代理人进行特定于其关系的投资，并且无法明确签约;以及（3）生产关系持续时间，需要持续的努力，也是不可收缩的。 关键的见解是，市场力量通过影响代理人提供持续努力的动机来塑造交易关系。 本研究开发了一个数学一般均衡框架，包括：（1）各种组织形式下的双边投资和贸易模型;（2）反映不对称、搜索努力和新代理人流入可能性的匹配模型;（3）代理人获得特定投资所需资源以及创造新生产性资产的资本市场模型。 这开发了框架的初步版本，并报告了一系列新的分析结果，说明了该方法的力量。 第一，市场力量可以抵消投资不完全可收缩性所产生的投资不足的激励，在市场摩擦为正的情况下可以产生最佳效率。 第二，减少市场摩擦会破坏现有贸易关系的稳定，从而对短期福利产生不利影响，而且这种减少也会使长期福利最小化。 第三，市场力量影响代理人选择一体化或非一体化的组织形式。 该项目研究组织形式，匹配，重新谈判和福利的设置特点是不确定性和/或不完整的信息质量的生产关系，以及在宏观经济学问题的应用，包括经济增长，政策传播和名义刚性。