Contracts, Relationships, and Real Activity

合同、关系和实际活动

• 批准号: 9975277
• 负责人: Garey Ramey
• 金额: $ 8.98万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1999
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1999-10-01 至 2000-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9975277&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Contracts; Relationships; Real; Activity

The aim of this project is to provide a new understanding of markets for capital, labor and other productive inputs, based on developing a clear accounting of the factors shaping long-term relationships that make up the markets. This inquiry focuses on two key dimensions. (1) The success of relationships depends on their ability to overcome contracting imperfections, such as limited liability, limited liquidity, and limited verifiability of actions. (2) Market outcomes are determined by the processes that bring agents together to form relationships, as well as the success of relationships in solving their contracting problems. Economic productivity, propagation of shocks, and the effectiveness of policy intervention are all tied to the formation, operation and breakdown of long-term relationships.The project consists of three main parts. The first part consists of a new theoretical model of credit markets in which liquidity is channeled from lenders to entrepreneurs through long-term relationships, and lenders may be constrained in their short-run access to liquidity. Relationships are subject to inefficient breakdown due to limited liability and limited liquidity. Outflows of aggregate liquidity induce persistent damage to financial structure by breaking up relationships. Complementarily between returns to investment and the structure of intermediation leads to multiple steady-state equilibria having different levels of aggregate liquidity, including a collapse state that may become the unique equilibrium outcome following a severe negative shock. The model is extended to consider relationships between multiple entrepreneurs and lenders, and the dynamics of policy intervention will be analyzedThe second part formulates and tests empirical implications of the model. The model predicts that greater availability of loanable funds to the banks in a state, as proxied by bank deposits or bank capital positions, should relate positively to real activity in the state. Further, greater cross-sectional dispersion of funds across banks should reduce real activity. The proposed research will test these implications using bank balance sheet data and state-level measures of economic activity as well as assessing the significance of liquidity allocation for the transmission of monetary shocks.The third part develops a stochastic dynamic monetary equilibrium model that couples the theoretical model of credit markets with the limited participation mechanism for producing nominal rigidity. The expanded model will yield important improvements in the amount of persistence of output responses, and the sluggishness of price responses, following monetary shocks, relative to previous models.

该项目的目的是在明确解释构成市场的长期关系的因素的基础上，提供对资本、劳动力和其他生产投入市场的新认识。本调查侧重于两个关键方面。(1)关系的成功取决于它们克服契约缺陷的能力，如有限责任、有限流动性和有限的行为可验证性。(2)市场结果取决于将代理人聚集在一起形成关系的过程，以及关系在解决合同问题方面的成功。经济生产率、冲击的传播和政策干预的有效性都与长期关系的形成、运作和破裂有关。第一部分包括一个新的信贷市场的理论模型，在这个模型中，流动性是通过长期关系从贷款人引导到企业家，贷款人可能会在短期内获得流动性受到限制。由于有限的责任和有限的流动性，关系容易受到效率低下的破坏。总流动性的流出通过破坏关系而导致对金融结构的持续损害。投资回报和中介结构之间的互补性导致了具有不同总流动性水平的多个稳态均衡，包括可能成为严重负面冲击后唯一均衡结果的崩溃状态。第二部分阐述并检验了该模型的实证意义。该模型预测，更大的可贷资金提供给银行在一个国家，代理银行存款或银行资本头寸，应呈正相关的真实的活动的状态。此外，资金在银行间更大的横向分散应该会减少真实的活动。本研究将使用银行资产负债表数据和国家层面的经济活动指标来检验这些影响，并评估流动性配置对货币冲击传导的重要性。第三部分建立了一个随机动态货币均衡模型，该模型将信贷市场的理论模型与产生名义刚性的有限参与机制相结合。与以前的模型相比，扩展后的模型将在货币冲击后产出反应的持续性和价格反应的迟缓性方面产生重要的改进。