The Legislative Connection in Congressional Campaign Finance: A Quasi-Experimental Study

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This proposal examines the campaign finance advantages held by incumbent Members of Congress. The disparity between incumbents' and challengers' campaign resources is commonly thought to reflect incumbents' positions and activities with the legislature. However, the sources of incumbents' campaign finance advantages are poorly understood. Through a series of quasi-experiments, this project ascertains the extent to which incumbents' financial advantages stem from office-holding, from positions or activities in the legislature, or from politicians' personal abilities and resources. By using turnover among members, both within office and within specific positions in Congress, this proposal isolates those factors that influence the distribution of campaign funds. The project develops a twenty-year data base of all contributions and legislative positions and activities. Data on contributions from specific Political Action Committees and individuals to candidates are drawn from the files of the Federal Election Commission. Data on the legislative positions of incumbents and activities in Congress from the Library of Congress Information Service and other public documents. The data set, with all the pairings of data, will be made available to the wider political science community. This project will add detailed information to debates over campaign finance.