Collaborative Research on Variation in Legislative Entrepreneurship in Presidential Systems: Data from Beyond the U.S. Case

总统制立法创业变异的合作研究：来自美国案例之外的数据

• 批准号: 9709695
• 负责人: Mark Jones
• 金额: $ 4万
• 依托单位: Michigan State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-06-01 至 2000-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9709695&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Variation; Legislative; Entrepreneurship

Legislators from the same party can entrepreneurially seek to serve particular constituencies, they can work together to pursue common programmatic goals, or they can more commonly, strike a balance somewhere along the continuum between the two. Entrepreneurial behavior by legislators to promote their own electoral survival can include breaking party discipline on the chamber floor, initiating constituency focused legislation, seeking district-targeted committee assignments, and allocating resources to local offices and staff. The extent to which they seek votes by stressing their own individual attributes (the `personal vote`) has profound consequences for whether representation will be particularistic or programmatic, whether or not regional and parochial concerns will be delegated to other levels of government, and whether or not interbranch stalemate and democratic instability are likely. This project measures legislative entrepreneurship in four Latin American presidential democracies: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Until now, virtually all comparative studies of entrepreneurship have included detailed data from only one presidential system - the United States. while comparing presidential and parliamentary systems is important, the fact that the executive and legislative branches in parliamentary systems do not have independent electoral origins dramatically changes the nature of interbranch relations, theories of representation, and the prospects for entrepreneurship. The researchers test their hypotheses using data on nomination procedures, electoral systems, and entrepreneurship collected during field work stays in each of the four countries. The resulting data base of information on behavior within legislative chambers is analyzed using quantitative and qualitative methodologies designed to exploit the variance in legislative entrepreneurship both cross-sectionally and time serially. The research fleshes out a recently developed model for explaining the likelihood that legislators will behave entrepreneurially and develops a research design for testing the model empirically. The findings should enhance our knowledge of the institutional incentives of politicians and offer ideas about how to explicitly design particular forms of representation, decentralization, and interbranch relations in presidential systems. The resulting data base will be of use to numerous scholars interested in the topic.

来自同一政党的立法者可以积极地寻求为特定的选区服务，他们可以共同努力追求共同的纲领目标，或者更常见的是，他们可以在两者之间的连续体的某个地方取得平衡。议员为促进自己在选举中的生存而采取的企业家行为包括：在议会厅违反党的纪律，发起以选区为重点的立法，寻求针对地区的委员会任务，以及为地方办事处和工作人员分配资源。他们通过强调自己的个人属性（“个人投票”）来寻求选票的程度，对代表是特殊的还是程序性的，是否会将地区和狭隘的问题委托给其他级别的政府，以及是否有可能出现部门间的僵局和民主不稳定有着深远的影响。本项目衡量四个拉丁美洲总统制民主国家的立法企业家精神：阿根廷、智利、哥伦比亚和委内瑞拉。到目前为止，几乎所有关于企业家精神的比较研究都只包含了一个总统制国家的详细数据——美国。虽然比较总统制和议会制很重要，但议会制的行政和立法部门并没有独立的选举起源，这一事实极大地改变了部门间关系的性质、代表制理论和创业前景。研究人员利用在这四个国家实地工作期间收集的提名程序、选举制度和企业家精神的数据来检验他们的假设。利用旨在利用立法企业家精神的横断面和时间序列差异的定量和定性方法，分析了立法院内部行为信息的数据基础。该研究充实了最近开发的一个模型，用于解释立法者行为具有企业家精神的可能性，并开发了一个研究设计，用于实证检验该模型。这些发现应该会增强我们对政治家制度激励的认识，并为如何在总统制中明确设计特定形式的代表权、权力下放和部门间关系提供思路。由此产生的数据库将对许多对该主题感兴趣的学者有用。