Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Dynamics of Policy Expertise Acquisition and Electoral Performance in Japan and Taiwan

政治学博士论文研究：日本和台湾政策专业知识获取与选举表现的动态

• 批准号: 0819527
• 负责人: Mark Jones
• 金额: $ 1.07万
• 依托单位: William Marsh Rice University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-08-01 至 2009-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0819527&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

How do legislators acquire policy expertise in legislatures without a well-established seniority rule for committee assignments? This research project investigates the acquisition of policy expertise by individual legislators and its relation with the achievement of legislator goals such as reelection, career advancement, and influencing public policy. In the US Congress, policy expertise has been acquired through consecutive assignments to the same committee. Since a strong seniority rule has been in force, committee assignments are generally automatically renewed, and thus, the process of acquiring policy expertise and its relationship with electoral incentives has not been adequately considered. Strong seniority systems similar to that found in the US Congress are not universal in the world, and legislators' motivation for developing policy expertise varies across countries. Different political institutions influence legislators' motivations to be an expert in a policy area(s). Through the study of legislatures in two democratic countries (Japan and Taiwan), this research develops a model of policy expertise acquisition for legislators operating in an institutional context different from that found in the United States.The Japanese Diet and Taiwanese Legislative Yuan are ideal objects of study because they provide a great deal of institutional variation. First, intra and inter country electoral system variance in these countries allows us to assess policy expertise acquisition within different electoral contexts. In regard to the Japanese Diet, the employment a single-nontransferable-vote (SNTV) electoral system until 1995 and a mixed member electoral system since 1995 allows for the examination of the differential impact on policy expertise acquisition of the electoral incentives provided by these two distinct systems. In addition, the Legislative Yuan, where most members were until 2008 largely selected using SNTV, allows for the investigation of legislative behavior under SNTV in a presidential democracy (in contrast to Japan's parliamentary democracy). The Legislative Yuan also provides variation in party control of committee assignments. In most democracies, committee post allocations are under the control of parties, and the literature provides little guidance on what happens when parties have no such control. The Legislative Yuan before 2002 provides the rare chance to examine committee careers within a context of no party control over committee assignments.This project's principal argument is legislators acquire policy expertise to achieve several goals, such as reelection, advancing their political career, and influencing policy. The different institutional contexts described above in turn affect the connection between these goals and the acquisition of policy expertise.To test the empirical implications of our general theoretical model, we examine legislators' policy activities, their relation to the policy needs of their respective districts, and the legislators' career trajectory. The dataset assembled for this project consists of data on: legislator policy expertise, policy needs of an electoral district, and the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. Legislators' policy activities include committee assignments, debate in committee and on the floor, voting record, and bill introduction.The project's intellectual merit is based on its provision of a deeper understanding of the process of policy expertise acquisition. The extant research on legislator policy expertise has been limited primarily to the US Congress, and the process of evolving policy expertise is understudied. The strong right of US incumbents to retain their committee membership prevents serious consideration of the process of policy expertise evolution. This project addresses these and other issues via the study of two Asian democracies. This research project has the following broader impact. First and foremost, it provides knowledge about when and under what institutional conditions the quality of public policy is improved though the acquisition of policy expertise by legislators. Second, it supplies vital information on the understudied Legislative Yuan. Third, the large dataset created for this project will represent an invaluable resource for future scholars interested in a variety of aspects of legislative behavior in Japan and Taiwan.

立法者如何在立法机构中获得政策专业知识，而没有一个完善的委员会分配的资历规则？本研究旨在探讨立法者个人获得政策专业知识及其与实现立法者目标（如连任、职业发展和影响公共政策）的关系。在美国国会，政策专业知识是通过连续被分配到同一个委员会而获得的。由于实行严格的资历规则，委员会的任命通常自动延长，因此，获得政策专门知识的过程及其与选举激励措施的关系没有得到充分考虑。 与美国国会类似的强资历制度在世界上并不普遍，各国立法者发展政策专长的动机也各不相同。不同的政治制度影响立法者成为某一政策领域专家的动机。本研究以日本和台湾两个民主国家的立法机构为研究对象，建立了一个与美国不同的制度背景下的立法者政策专长习得模型。日本国会和台湾立法院是理想的研究对象，因为它们提供了大量的制度差异。首先，这些国家的国内和国际选举制度差异使我们能够评估不同选举背景下的政策专业知识获取。日本国会在1995年以前采用单一不可转移投票制（SNTV），在1995年以后采用混合选举制，这两种选举制对政策专门知识的获得产生了不同的影响。此外，立法院在2008年之前大部分议员都是通过SNTV选出的，在总统制民主（与日本的议会制民主不同）下，立法院允许通过SNTV调查立法行为。立法院也规定了党对委员会任命的控制。在大多数民主国家，委员会职位的分配是在政党的控制之下，文献几乎没有提供关于当政党没有这种控制时会发生什么的指导。民国八十二年以前的立法院，是一个难得的机会，可以在无党执政的情况下，检视委员会的生涯，本研究的主要论点是，立法委员获得政策专长，以达成连任、政治生涯、影响政策等目的。上述不同的制度背景反过来影响这些目标和政策专长的获得之间的联系。为了检验我们的一般理论模型的实证含义，我们研究了立法者的政策活动，他们与各自地区的政策需求的关系，以及立法者的职业轨迹。为这个项目收集的数据集包括：立法者的政策专长，选区的政策需求，以及现任候选人的选举表现。立法者的政策活动包括委员会任务、委员会辩论和现场辩论、投票记录和法案介绍。该项目的智力价值在于它提供了对政策专业知识获取过程的更深入理解。现有的立法者政策专长的研究主要局限于美国国会，政策专长的演变过程是研究不足。美国现任者保留委员会成员资格的强大权利阻碍了对政策专业知识演变过程的认真考虑。本项目通过对两个亚洲民主国家的研究来解决这些问题和其他问题。该研究项目具有以下广泛的影响。首先，它提供了关于何时以及在何种体制条件下通过立法者获得政策专门知识来提高公共政策质量的知识。第二，它提供了关于未被研究的立法院的重要信息。 第三，为这个项目创建的大型数据集将为未来对日本和台湾立法行为的各个方面感兴趣的学者提供宝贵的资源。