Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Procedural Cartels and the Mexican State Legislature

主要研究者：马克琼斯和劳尔冈萨雷斯标题：博士论文研究：程序卡特尔和墨西哥州立法机关0720310摘要政党可以保持他们对立法议程的控制时，没有连任？ 本研究项目通过分析选举激励和政党政治如何塑造墨西哥州立法机构的议程控制来解决这个问题。 在过去的二十年里，选举竞争和财政分权的同时兴起，鼓励州立法机构在一系列政策领域维护自己的自主权。议员们不再自动服从州长办公室;相反，他们成为政治新闻的积极参与者，因此值得更多的关注。 选举竞争的这种增长在全国各地并不均衡。 尽管一些国家享有充满活力的政治气候，但还有许多其他国家的独裁飞地仍然蓬勃发展。这种情况提供了一个很好的机会，以了解更多关于党派议程控制，特别是在何种程度上，它与经济和选举竞争保持相对恒定的各种因素的变化。 该研究项目采用四个主要的数据来源，以评估在31个州的立法机关的30个党派议程控制的变化。第一种是精英访谈，前任和现任立法者讨论立法者与政党的关系。第二个是管理每个州立法机构的宪法制定规则。第三种是唱名表决记录，通过分析可以确定党派对议程控制的影响。第四部分是对新莱昂州议会议程制定过程的深入案例研究。 这个研究项目有助于我们了解的影响，选举激励措施的党派议程控制解决墨西哥国家政治文献的主要限制：它依赖于单一的国家案例研究。通过整合这四个数据源，本研究项目可以系统地比较议程控制在墨西哥州立法机构在两个立法任期，而不是简单地限制自己在特定的时间点的几个案例。 简而言之，该项目将产生的结果不仅具有高水平的内部有效性，而且还可以告知我们世界其他地方的背景。

Primary Investigators: Mark Jones and Raul GonzalezTitle: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Procedural Cartels and the Mexican State Legislature0720310AbstractCan political parties maintain their control over legislative agendas when there is no reelection? This research project addresses this question by analyzing how electoral incentives and party politics shape agenda control in the Mexican state legislatures. Over the past twenty years, the concurrent rise of electoral competition and fiscal decentralization has encouraged the state legislatures to assert their autonomy across a range of policy domains. No longer are deputies automatically deferring to the governor's office; they have instead become active participants of the political press and thus merit greater attention. This growth in electoral competition has not proceeded evenly throughout the country. Whereas some states enjoy vibrant political climates, there are many others where authoritarian enclaves still thrive. This situation provides an excellent opportunity to learn more about partisan agenda control, particularly about the extent to which it varies with economic and electoral competition by holding a variety of factors relatively constant. This research project employs four main data sources to evaluate the variation in partisan agenda control across 30 of the 31 state legislatures. The first are elite interviews, in which former and current legislators discuss the relationship between legislator and party. The second are the agenda-setting rules governing each state legislature. The third are roll call voting records, the analysis of which can identify partisan affects on agenda control. The fourth is an in-depth case study of the agenda setting process in the state legislature of Nuevo Leon. This research project contributes to our understanding of the effect electoral incentives have on partisan agenda control by addressing the primary limitation of the Mexican state politics literature: its reliance on single state case studies. By integrating the four data sources, this research project can systematically compare agenda control in the Mexican state legislatures across two legislative terms rather than simply limit itself to a few cases at particular points in time. In short, the project will yield results that not only enjoy a high level of internal validity but can also inform us of contexts elsewhere in the world.