Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Procedural Cartels and the Mexican State Legislature

主要调查人员：马克·琼斯和劳尔·冈萨雷斯标题：博士论文研究：程序卡特尔和墨西哥州议会摘要当没有连任时，政党可以保持对立法议程的控制吗？这项研究项目通过分析选举激励和政党政治如何影响墨西哥州立法机构的议程控制来解决这个问题。在过去的二十年里，选举竞争和财政分权的同时上升鼓励了州立法机构在一系列政策领域维护其自主权。代表不再自动服从州长办公室；相反，他们成为政治新闻的积极参与者，因此值得更多关注。选举竞争的这种增长并不是在全国范围内均匀进行的。虽然一些州享有充满活力的政治氛围，但还有许多其他州的威权飞地仍然蓬勃发展。这种情况提供了一个极好的机会来更多地了解党派议程控制，特别是通过保持各种因素相对恒定来了解它随着经济和选举竞争而变化的程度。这项研究项目使用了四个主要数据来源来评估31个州立法机构中30个州在党派议程控制方面的差异。首先是精英访谈，在采访中，前任和现任立法者讨论立法者和政党之间的关系。第二个是管理各州立法机构的议程设置规则。第三种是点名投票记录，对记录的分析可以确定党派对议程控制的影响。第四部分是对新莱昂州立法机构议程设置过程的深入个案研究。这一研究项目有助于我们了解选举激励对党派议程控制的影响，因为它解决了墨西哥州政治文献的主要局限性：它依赖于单个州的案例研究。通过整合四个数据来源，这项研究项目可以系统地比较墨西哥州立法机构在两个立法任期内的议程控制，而不是简单地将自己限制在特定时间点的几个案例中。简而言之，该项目将产生的结果不仅具有很高的内部有效性，而且还可以让我们了解世界其他地方的情况。

Primary Investigators: Mark Jones and Raul GonzalezTitle: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Procedural Cartels and the Mexican State Legislature0720310AbstractCan political parties maintain their control over legislative agendas when there is no reelection? This research project addresses this question by analyzing how electoral incentives and party politics shape agenda control in the Mexican state legislatures. Over the past twenty years, the concurrent rise of electoral competition and fiscal decentralization has encouraged the state legislatures to assert their autonomy across a range of policy domains. No longer are deputies automatically deferring to the governor's office; they have instead become active participants of the political press and thus merit greater attention. This growth in electoral competition has not proceeded evenly throughout the country. Whereas some states enjoy vibrant political climates, there are many others where authoritarian enclaves still thrive. This situation provides an excellent opportunity to learn more about partisan agenda control, particularly about the extent to which it varies with economic and electoral competition by holding a variety of factors relatively constant. This research project employs four main data sources to evaluate the variation in partisan agenda control across 30 of the 31 state legislatures. The first are elite interviews, in which former and current legislators discuss the relationship between legislator and party. The second are the agenda-setting rules governing each state legislature. The third are roll call voting records, the analysis of which can identify partisan affects on agenda control. The fourth is an in-depth case study of the agenda setting process in the state legislature of Nuevo Leon. This research project contributes to our understanding of the effect electoral incentives have on partisan agenda control by addressing the primary limitation of the Mexican state politics literature: its reliance on single state case studies. By integrating the four data sources, this research project can systematically compare agenda control in the Mexican state legislatures across two legislative terms rather than simply limit itself to a few cases at particular points in time. In short, the project will yield results that not only enjoy a high level of internal validity but can also inform us of contexts elsewhere in the world.