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Collaborative Research on Sequential Voting

Collaborative Research on Sequential Voting
顺序投票的合作研究
批准号:
9710580
负责人:
Rebecca Morton
金额:
$4.86万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1997
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1997-07-01 至 1999-06-30

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
应用于大型选举的空间投票的传统正式理论分析几乎完全集中在选民同时做出选择的选举上。在许多情况下,这是一个准确的描述,尽管投票可能会在一段时间内按顺序进行,但选民通常在不知道之前投票的人做出选择的情况下做出选择。然而,还有其他值得注意的大型选举,在这些选举中,选民群体在知道早期选民在同一选举中做出的选择的情况下做出选择。在这项调查中,研究人员重点关注了一个特别有趣的顺序投票案例:美国的总统初选。在总统初选制度中,后来进行初选的州的选民在做出选择时,就会知道之前几个州的初选结果。然而,该党的提名是由早期和后期各州的选票决定的。因此,由于初选制度,决定提名的投票是按顺序进行的。在这项研究中,研究人员着重于顺序投票与同时投票的两个不同方面,以及投票过程因此导致不同结果的可能性。首先,在顺序投票过程中存在信息聚合的可能性,这在同时投票下是不可能的。第二,如果投票是按顺序进行的,候选人在投票过程中退出选举的可能性是独一无二的。目前的研究通过考察风险偏好差异对投票行为和所选候选人的作用,扩展了早期对信息聚合的调查。在此基础上,对理论模型进行了扩展,考虑了候选人退出对这些因素的影响。这项研究包括对理论预测的实验检验。
英文摘要
Traditional formal theoretical analyses of spatial voting applied to large elections have focused almost exclusively on elections in which voters make their choices simultaneously. In many cases this is an accurate portrayal and although voting may take place sequentially over a period of time, voters typically make their choices without the knowledge of the choices made by those who have voted earlier. However, there are other notable large elections in which groups of voters make choices with knowledge of the choices made by earlier voters in the same election. In this investigation, the researchers focus on a particularly interesting case of sequential voting: presidential primaries in the United States. In the presidential primary system voters in states that have later primaries know the outcomes of the primaries in earlier states when they make their choices. However, the nomination of the party is a function of the votes in both early and later states. Thus, voting that determines the nomination, because of the primary system, occurs sequentially. In this research the investigators focus on two ways in which sequential voting is different from simultaneous voting and the possibility that the voting process leads to different outcomes as a consequence. First, there is the possibility for information aggregation during the sequential voting process that is not possible under simultaneous voting. Second, when voting is sequential there is the unique possibility for candidates to withdraw from the election during the voting process. The current research extends an earlier investigation of information aggregation by examining the role of differences in risk preferences on the voting behavior and candidate selected. The research is then extends the theoretical model to consider the effects of candidate exit on these factors. The research consists of experimental tests of the theoretical predictions.
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Doctoral Dissertation Research: Deceptive Self-Signals - Activating Political Identity to Affirm a Positive Self-Image
  • 批准号:
    1647425
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $2.38万
  • 财政年份:
    2017
  • 负责人:
    Rebecca Morton
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Democracy and War: An Experiment
  • 批准号:
    1065780
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.54万
  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 负责人:
    Rebecca Morton
  • 依托单位:
DTA - University of Liverpool
  • 批准号:
    EP/P505615/1
  • 项目类别:
    Training Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $276.66万
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 负责人:
    Rebecca Morton
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Building Peace Through Institutions? Revisiting the Logic of Institutional Engineering in Divided Societies Through Experiments
  • 批准号:
    1024374
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.19万
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 负责人:
    Rebecca Morton
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Research on Quantum Field Theory without a Lagrangian Description
  • 批准号:
    24ZR1403900
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
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  • 依托单位:
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