Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining

Baron-Ferreohn立法谈判模型是立法政治研究中使用最广泛的正式框架之一。 该模型的变体已被用于研究立法投票规则，委员会权力，猪肉桶计划，政府组建，多党选举和议会间谈判。 在考虑一个简单版本的模型，其中有三个政党，没有一个政党在立法机构中拥有多数票，BF模型预测，拥有提案权的政党将提出一个最小的获胜联盟。 这将包括它和另一个成员，使第三方为零。 正如鲁宾斯坦模式一样，提议的政党将给其提议的联盟伙伴足够的资金来确保接受。 该金额（或延续价值）等于联盟伙伴的预期收益，如果提议被拒绝，谈判继续。 因此，提案总是在第一轮就被接受。 调查人员注意到，提议的政党总是选择具有最低持续价值的政党作为其联盟伙伴。 战利品的分配通常是高度不平等的，特别是如果双方的折扣系数很低的话。 研究小组在受控的实验室环境中进行了一系列实验，测试BF模型的预测。 初步研究表明，BF模型的预测很少得到支持。 特别是，提议者经常分配给所有三个玩家，在两个玩家联盟中，分配比例比预测的更高。 在这个项目中，研究人员从理论和经验两方面研究了预测失败的原因。 该项目的第一个目标是检查结果对游戏形式变化的鲁棒性。 在初步实验中，使用了五期和四期模型。 例如，有人可能会反对，认为这些模型对受试者要求太高，无法完全理解。 因此，第一优先事项是在具有较少周期的较简单游戏中复制他们的发现。 因此，研究人员用两个和三个时期的游戏版本进行新的治疗。 接下来，研究人员打算调查早期发现的平分的可能理论解释，然后在实验室中进行测试。 在他们对这些理论的调查中，他们进行了额外的实验，在某些情况下，计算机模拟以及理论研究。 他们集中在三个可能的解释的结果：1）均衡的概念与非平凡的错误，2）规范的公平或利他主义，和，3）公约和焦点。 由于Baron-Ferreohn模型是一种广泛使用的方法来理解立法多数主义谈判，拟议的研究应有助于理解该模型的局限性，并因此立法多数主义谈判。

The Baron-Ferejohn model (BF) of legislative bargaining is one of the most widely used formal frameworks in the study of legislative politics. Variants of the model have been used in the study of legislative voting rules, committee power, pork-barrel programs, government formation, multi-party elections, and inter-chamber bargaining. In considering a simple version of the model where there are three political parties with no party having a majority of the votes in the legislature, the BF model predicts that the party with proposal power will propose a minimal winning coalition. This will consist of it and one other member, leaving the third party with zero. As in the Rubinstein model the proposing party will give its proposed coalition partner just the amount necessary to secure an acceptance. The amount (or continuation value) equals the coalition partner's expected pay-off if the proposal was rejected and the bargaining continued. Proposals are thus always accepted in the first round. The investigators note that the proposing party will always choose as its coalition partner the party with the lowest continuation value. The division of spoils will in general be highly unequal, especially if the parties' discount factors are low. The research team has conducted a series of experiments testing the predictions of the BF model in a controlled laboratory environment. The preliminary research shows that the BF model's predictions are rarely supported. In particular, proposers often allocate to all three players and, in two-player coalitions, allocate more proportionally than predicted. In this project the researchers investigate why the predictions fail, both theoretically and empirically. The first goal in the project is to examine the robustness of the findings to changes in the game form. In the preliminary experiments five and four period models used. One may object, for instance, that these models are too demanding for subjects to fully comprehend. the first priority is thus to replicate their findings in a simpler game with fewer periods. Thus, the researchers conduct new treatments with two and three period versions of the game. Next, the researchers intend to investigate possible theoretical accounts for earlier findings of equal splits and then test them in the laboratory. In their investigation of these theoretical accounts they conduct additional experiments and, in some cases, computer simulations, as well as the theoretical research. They focus on three possible explanations for the results: 1) equilibrium concepts with non-trivial error, 2) norms of fairness or altruism, and, 3) conventions and focal points. Since the Baron-Ferejohn model is a widely used approach to understanding legislative majoritarian bargaining, the proposed research should help in understanding the limits of the model and, legislative majoritarian bargaining as a consequence.