Conference on Income and Wealth to be held in Washington, D. C., Spring 1998

收入和财富会议将于 1998 年春季在华盛顿特区举行

• 批准号: 9730608
• 负责人: Charles Hulten
• 金额: $ 2万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-05-01 至 1999-04-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9730608&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Conference; Income; Wealth; held; Washington

The project analyzes economic and political design features of social security programs. It includes the construction of a large cross country and time series data set measuring various dimensions of program design, the size of social security administrations and their components as well as other related economic and social measures such as retirement patterns and old age political participation. A preliminary analysis uncovers a number of empirical regularities across countries. Four of those findings of the study are: (1) old age benefit eligibility almost always depends on a person's labor market status, (2) old age benefit eligibility rarely depends on a person's wealth, (3) social security appears to grow more than could be accounted by the growth of the retirement aged population or national income, (4) retirement aged citizens appear to devote more effort to political activities than do the young. These regularities indicates that both theoretical and the empirical analyses need to relate social the origin and growth of the social security administration to labor markets and to the political behavior of the retirement aged. The project will expand the data sets in various dimensions. The investigators will expand the institutional and `design` variables for a number of years and for a larger cross section of countries, include finer and more comprehensive measures of social security programs as well as retirement patterns of the retirement aged, and include measures of political, legal, and economic institutions. The PIs will also construct measures of `intensity` of political participation and separate the time intensive from the money intensive forms of participation. The project will also investigate `pressure group` and other models of collective choice that might explain why the retirement aged are able to get pensions from the young and why those pension have the eligibility requirements and other features mentioned above. A preliminary analysis of a model where the political power of a particular group depends on the amount of time devoted to political activities, the investigatorrs show that the retirement aged have incentives to introduce retirement inducing regulations like the ones observed in the data, which will reduce the value of the time of the members of their own group. This, in turn, enlarges their political power and will allow them to extract more transfers from the young. The model explains why the pension system induces the retirement aged to retire, why the size of the social security program appears to be related to the amount of restrictions on the work of the retirement aged, why the retirement aged are more interested in politics, and why they devote a larger fraction of their time to political activities.

该项目分析了社会保障计划的经济和政治设计特征。 它包括建立一个大型跨国和时间序列数据集，衡量方案设计的各个方面、社会保障管理机构及其组成部分的规模以及其他相关的经济和社会措施，如退休模式和老年人的政治参与。 初步分析揭示了各国的一些经验教训。 该研究的四项发现是：（1）老年福利金的资格几乎总是取决于一个人的劳动力市场状况，（2）老年福利金的资格很少取决于一个人的财富，（3）社会保障的增长似乎超过了退休年龄人口或国民收入的增长，（4）退休年龄的市民似乎比年轻人更致力于政治活动。 这表明，无论是理论分析还是实证分析，都需要将社会保障管理的起源和发展与劳动力市场以及退休老人的政治行为联系起来。 该项目将在各个方面扩大数据集。 调查人员将扩大若干年的制度和“设计”变量，并扩大国家的横截面，包括更精细和更全面的社会保障计划措施以及退休年龄的退休模式，并包括政治、法律的和经济制度的措施。 参与者指数还将制定衡量政治参与“强度”的措施，并将时间密集型参与与金钱密集型参与区分开来。 该项目还将调查“压力集团”和其他集体选择模式，以解释为什么退休老人能够从年轻人那里领取养老金，为什么这些养老金具有资格要求和上述其他特点。 对一个特定群体的政治权力取决于投入政治活动的时间的模型的初步分析表明，退休年龄的人有动机引入退休诱导法规，如数据中观察到的那样，这将减少他们自己群体成员的时间价值。这反过来又扩大了他们的政治权力，使他们能够从年轻人那里获得更多的转移。该模型解释了为什么养老金制度会导致退休老人退休，为什么社会保障计划的规模似乎与退休老人工作的限制有关，为什么退休老人对政治更感兴趣，以及为什么他们将更多的时间投入政治活动。