Developing ERC: A Model of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

大多数商业和经济理论都假定，自利的物质利益是行为的唯一驱动力。还有其他重要的动机吗？当我们环顾四周时，很难判断正确的答案：人们在市场上为利润而激烈竞争。但他们也要求工作场所公平。人们达成互利的交易；其他时候，谈判在激烈的个人纠纷中破裂。人们在公共领域“搭便车”，并为慈善机构捐款。偶然经验主义所暗示的各种行为在实验室中得到了反映：以市场制度为特征的实验往往会产生与物质利益斗争相关的竞争行为。简单的讨价还价情况产生的结果表明，公平的作用。如果有机会，有些人会搭别人的便车，而有些人则会选择贡献自己的力量。ERC理论的前提是，人们的动机是物质利益和社会地位。ERC代表公平、互惠和竞争，这是该理论捕捉的行为类型。该理论背后的基本思想是，不同的情况提供了不同的机会来权衡物质利益和社会地位。例如，在两人谈判的情况下，结束谈判而不是接受一个糟糕的交易，可以避免提高谈判伙伴的社会地位而损害自己的地位。因此，对公平协议的要求——即保护社会地位的协议——在谈判中具有可信度。相比之下，在一个有许多贸易伙伴可供选择的庞大而非个人的市场中，很难单方面影响他人的社会地位。ERC意味着提高自己在市场中的地位（以及获得最大物质利益）的最佳方式是竞争。ERC仍处于早期发展阶段，但它最终可能会影响我们对经济和商业领域各种问题的看法，包括市场应该如何构建，解决冲突的方法，以及补救搭便车问题的机制设计。我请求资助进行必要的实验，以便在两个重要方向上进一步发展该模型。ERC所解释的大部分内容本质上都是定性的。定量预测更为精确，但在这一水平上几乎没有必要的数据进行测试。我提出的第一个实验旨在测试该理论的基本定量前提。该理论目前依赖于一种相当粗糙的社会地位衡量标准。我提出的第二个实验旨在确定是否有必要进行修改，如果有的话，又需要进行哪些修改。其中一些实验对解决冲突的问题有直接的影响。

Bolton Most business and economic theories assume self-interested material gain is the sole driver of behavior. Are there other important motives? When we look around, the right answer is hard to judge: People compete fiercely for profits in the marketplace. But they also demand fairness in their workplace. People strike mutually beneficial bargains; other times, negotiations collapse in bitter, personal dispute. People 'free ride' on the public domain - and contribute to charities. The variety of behavior suggested by casual empiricism is mirrored in the laboratory: Experiments featuring market institutions tend to produce the type of competitive behavior we associate with the struggle for material gain. Simple bargaining situations yield results suggesting a role for fairness. When given the chance, some free ride on the efforts of others, while some choose to contribute. The ERC theory is based on the premise that people are motivated by both material gain, and social status. ERC stands for equity, reciprocity and competition, the types of behavior the theory captures. the basic idea behind the theory is that different situations present different opportunities to trade-off material gain and social status. For example, in a two-person negotiating situation, ending the negotiation instead of accepting a bad deal avoids elevating the social status of ones bargaining partner to the detriment of ones own status. Hence demands for a fair agreement - that is, an agreement that protects social status - have credibility in bargaining encounters. In contrast, it is very hard to unilaterally influence anyone else's social status in a large, impersonal market where there are many trading partners to choose from. ERC implies that the best way to improve ones status in a market (as well as to make the most material gain) is to compete. ERC is still an early development stage, but it could eventually influence how we think about a wide variety of issues in the economic and business domain, including how markets should be structured, methods for conflicts resolution, and the design of mechanisms to remedy free riding problems. I am asking for funding to perform the experiments necessary to develop the model further in two important directions. Most of what ERC has been demonstrated to explain is qualitative in nature. Quantitative predictions are more precise, but there is little in the way of necessary data for testing at this level. The first experiment I propose is designed to test the foundational quantitative premises of the theory. The theory presently relies on a rather crude measure of social status. The second experiment I propose is intended to determine whether modification is necessary, and if so, what modification. Some of these experiments have a direct baring on the issue of conflict resolution.