Mechanism Design for Indivisible Goods Allocation

不可分割货物分配机制设计

• 批准号: 9904214
• 负责人: Yan Chen
• 金额: $ 6.58万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1999
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1999-08-01 至 2001-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9904214&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Mechanism; Design; Indivisible; Goods; Allocation

School choice is one of the hottest topics in education. It means giving parents the opportunity to choose the schools their children will attend. Since it is not possible to assign each student to her top choice school, a central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. By now several cities including Boston, Cambridge, Little Rock, San Jose, and Seattle have adopted school choice plans. While each of these plans has its protocol and guidelines for the assignment of students, none of them has a rigorous procedure. The lack of rigorous procedures offers opportunities to manipulation and results in appeals by parents who are unsatisfied by the school assignments of their children. This project introduces a new class of indivisible goods allocation problems that model public school choice, proposes a mechanism for rigorously assigning students to schools, and analyzes it. The project also studies the allocation of housing with existing tenants. The main application is on-campus housing, although the model has other applications such as public housing, office space allocation, and parking space allocation. Existing allocation mechanisms are shown to have serious shortcomings including inefficiency. An alternative mechanism is shown to overcome these shortcomings. Additional properties of this mechanism are studied and experiments are conducted to test the theoretical results that compare the performances of this mechanism and a widely used common real-life mechanism. Both of these projects deal with design and analysis of mechanisms for real-life indivisible goods allocation problems.

择校是教育领域最热门的话题之一。 这意味着让父母有机会选择他们的孩子将要就读的学校。 由于不可能将每个学生分配到她的首选学校，因此学校选择的中心问题是学生分配机制的设计。 到目前为止，包括波士顿、剑桥、小石城、圣何塞和西雅图在内的几个城市已经采用了择校计划。 虽然这些计划中的每一个都有自己的协议和指导方针的学生分配，他们都没有一个严格的程序。 由于缺乏严格的程序，家长有机会操纵和上诉，因为他们对子女的学校作业不满意。 本项目介绍了一种新的不可分割的商品分配问题，该问题模拟了公立学校的选择，提出了一种严格分配学生到学校的机制，并对其进行了分析。 主要应用是校内住房，尽管该模型还有其他应用，如公共住房，办公空间分配和停车位分配。 现有的分配机制被证明有严重的缺点，包括效率低下。 另一种机制，以克服这些缺点。研究了该机制的其他特性，并进行了实验来测试理论结果，将该机制的性能与广泛使用的常见现实生活中的机制进行比较。 这两个项目都涉及现实生活中不可分割的商品分配问题的机制设计和分析。