Collaborative Research: Studies of Contracting and Strategic Behavior
Collaborative Research: Studies of Contracting and Strategic Behavior
批准号:
9911685
负责人:
Ilya Segal
金额:
$6.29万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2000
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2000-05-15 至 2002-04-30
中文摘要
这份提案描述了两个项目。第一个是《与外部性竞争的非合作基础》,这是伊利亚·西格尔和迈克尔·温斯顿之间的合作。第二个是“房屋选址中的战略预先承诺”,这项工作将由迈克尔·温斯顿独自完成。第一个项目研究了在不同代理人与委托人之间的合同存在外部性的情况下,一个委托人和N个代理人之间的双边合同。在文献中存在两种分析这些设置的方法。一是研究特定的非合作双边讨价还价博弈。另一种假设N是大的,并分析了一种竞争均衡。目前,两者都不能完全令人满意。第一种方法的问题是,不同的非合作契约博弈会导致困难的、往往是多个结果。第二个问题是,所研究的竞争均衡概念并不像传统的竞争均衡概念那样,被证明是N变大的极限。这个项目有两个目标。首先,确定对这些契约环境的预测,这些预测对假设的特定讨价还价过程是稳健的。第二,为这些环境中的竞争均衡发展一个非合作的基础。初步研究表明,人们可以确定两个通常研究的非合作博弈的稳健均衡预测,并且当竞争均衡存在时,它确实是这些博弈均衡结果的唯一限制。第二个项目是关于战略预承诺的实证研究。博弈论涌入经济学的最重要方面之一是,它被用来开发战略预先承诺的模型。在这样的模型中,一个代理人对长期决策变量的选择在一定程度上取决于该代理人的期望,即这个选择将影响后来行动的代理人所做的决策。近年来,这样的模型被用于经济学的许多领域。然而,尽管它们在理论上得到了广泛的应用,但很少有人关注战略预先承诺理论的经验适用性。这个项目试图在独栋房屋的建造者做出选址决定的情况下这样做。有几个原因说明了为什么这是一个有吸引力的领域来寻找这样的影响。首先,建造独栋住宅所伴随的选址决定是极其永久性的。其次,在影响房主效用的各种因素中,几乎可以肯定的是,与邻近房屋的距离是一个重要因素。第三,房屋建造决策通常是交错的,因此允许比较当地块已经完全被已建好的地块包围时所做的位置决策的行为与当一个相邻地块仍未建在其上时所做的位置选择。第四,有许多可观察到的因素影响着一块土地上不同地点的可取性,这有助于确定战略影响。最后,这里建立的模型类型可能会进一步应用于城市经济学中的问题,如研究分区法规的影响。
英文摘要
This proposal describes two projects. The first, "Non-cooperative Foundations for Competition with Externalities," is collaborative work between llya Segal and Michael Whinston. The second, "Strategic Precommitment in House Location Choices" is work that will be done solely by Michael Whinston. The first project studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents in the presence of externalities among different agents' contracts with the principal. Two approaches to analyzing these settings exist in the literature. One studies specific non-cooperative bilateral bargaining games. The other supposes that N is large and analyzes a type of competitive equilibrium. Neither is currently fully satisfactory. The first approach has the problem that different non-cooperative contracting games lead to difficult, and often multiple, outcomes. The second has the problem that the notions of competitive equilibrium studied have not been justified as a limit of situations in which N gets large, as has the traditional concept of competitive equilibrium. This project has two goals. First, to identify predictions for these contracting settings that are robust to the specific bargaining processes assumed. Second, to develop a non-cooperative foundation for competitive equilibrium in these settings. Preliminary research suggests that one can identify robust equilibrium predictions for two commonly studied non-cooperative games, and that when a competitive equilibrium exists, it is indeed the only limit of equilibrium outcomes of these games. The second project is an empirical investigation of strategic precommitment. Among the most significant aspects of the influx of game theory into economics has been its use to develop models of strategic precommitment. In such models, one agent's choice of a long-lived decision variable is determined in part by the agent's expectation that this choice will affect the decisions made by later-moving agents. Such models have been used in recent years in numerous areas of economics. However, despite their widespread theoretical use, much less attention has focused on examining the empirical applicability of the theory of strategic precommitment. This project attempts to do so in the context of location decisions made by builders of single family houses. There are several reasons why this is an attractive area to look for such effects. First, the location decision that accompanies building a single-family house is extremely permanent. Second, among the various factors that contribute to the utility of the homeowner, the distance from neighboring houses is almost certainly a significant one. Third, house building decisions are typically staggered and so permit a comparison of the behavior of the location decisions made when a parcel is already fully surrounded by already built-upon parcels to the location choices made when one adjacent parcel is still not built-upon. Fourth, there are a number of observable factors that affect the desirability of various locations on a parcel of land that can aid in the identification of strategic effects. Finally, the type of models built here may have further application to issues in urban economics such as the study of the impact of zoning regulation.
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Collaborative Research: Studies of Property Rights and Merger Policy
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批准号:0961693
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$27.83万
-
财政年份:2010
-
负责人:Ilya Segal
-
依托单位:
Collaborative Research: Studies of Innovation and Information
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批准号:0318447
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$14.25万
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财政年份:2003
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负责人:Ilya Segal
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依托单位:
Communication Costs in Economic Mechanisms and Organizations
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批准号:0214500
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$15.2万
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财政年份:2002
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负责人:Ilya Segal
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依托单位:
Contracting with Externalities
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批准号:9729694
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$9.31万
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财政年份:1998
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负责人:Ilya Segal
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依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
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