Contracting with Externalities

与外部性签订合同

• 批准号: 9729694
• 负责人: Ilya Segal
• 金额: $ 9.31万
• 依托单位: University of California-Berkeley
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-04-01 至 2001-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9729694&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Contracting; Externalities

Project Abstract In many economic situations, bilateral contracting imposes external effects on third parties. For example: A shareholder tendering his shares to a corporate raider who is superior to the firm's incumbent management increasing the probability of takeover, thereby benefiting the firm's other shareholders. A creditor exchanging debt for equity in a distressed firm reduces the probability of bankruptcy, thereby benefiting the firm's other creditors. A buyer of a VCR increases the market for video rentals, thereby benefiting the owners of compatible VCRs. A merger of competing firms increases the market price, thereby benefiting other firms in the market. A private contributor to a public good benefits other consumers of the good. A buyer signing an exclusive dealing contract reduces the potential for future competition in the market, thereby hurting other buyers. A manufacturer selling his output to a retailer reduces the price in the downstream market, thus hurting competing retailers. In all these instances, the contracting parties' failure to take external effects into account may give rise to socially inefficient outcomes. This project develops a general model of contracting with externalities which unifies the examples listed above, and illuminates the general nature of arising inefficiencies. In particular, the dependence of the arising distortions depend on various assumptions, including the number of parties involved, the nature bargaining among them, their ability to make discriminatory offers, and the set of contracts available to them. This analysis has numerous implications for the optimal design of property rights and contracting procedures in environments with externalities. Applications include those from finance (bankruptcies and takeovers), industrial organization (vertical and horizontal contracting and mergers), and property law (the design of legal entitlements).

项目摘要在许多经济情况下，双边承包会对第三方产生外部影响。例如：股东将自己的股份出售给比公司现任管理层更高的公司掠夺者，增加了接管的可能性，从而使公司的其他股东受益。债权人将陷入困境的公司的债权转换为股权可以降低破产的可能性，从而使公司的其他债权人受益。购买录像机的人增加了录像带租赁市场，从而使兼容录像机的所有者受益。相互竞争的公司的合并提高了市场价格，从而使市场上的其他公司受益。公共产品的私人贡献者使该产品的其他消费者受益。签署排他性交易合同的买家减少了未来市场竞争的可能性，从而损害了其他买家的利益。制造商将其产品出售给零售商会降低下游市场的价格，从而损害竞争对手的零售商。在所有这些情况下，缔约方不考虑外部影响可能会导致社会效率低下的结果。这个项目开发了一个具有外部性的合同的一般模型，它统一了上面列出的例子，并阐明了产生低效的一般性质。特别是，所产生的扭曲取决于各种假设，包括所涉各方的数目、它们之间的谈判性质、它们提出歧视性要约的能力以及它们可以获得的一套合同。这一分析对在具有外部性的环境中的产权和合同程序的优化设计有许多影响。应用领域包括金融(破产和接管)、产业组织(纵向和横向承包和合并)和物权法(法定权利的设计)。