Collaborative Research on the Reform Party and Major Party Change

改革党与主要政党变革的合作研究

• 批准号: 9987459
• 负责人: Ronald Rapoport
• 金额: $ 5.1万
• 依托单位: College of William and Mary
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2000
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2000-03-01 至 2006-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9987459&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Reform; Party; Major

The 1992-96 election cycle saw several remarkable developments: in 1992, Ross Perot received the second largest third-party vote since the Civil War; in 1994, the Republicans won majorities of the House and Senate for the first time in forty years; and in 1996, the Reform Party emerged as the institutional extension of the Perot movement. In his second run, Perot's vote declined to just over eight percent, but he still managed to become the first third-party candidate to win more than five percent in two successive presidential elections since the formation of the Republican Party. Based on work completed from our research on these elections, we conclude that these remarkable events are closely related. Perot's 1992 constituency presented the major parties with a nearly irresistible target of opportunity, which the Republicans were able to capitalize on much more successfully than were the Decemorats, especially in 1994. By articulating and testing a theory of third-party support and linking it to major-party change, we have developed micro-behavioral evidence to explain how a third-party movement, such as that of Perot, can bring about major-party change. Briefly, the theory posits a positive, or "pull," component that results from attraction to the third-party candidate, and a negative, or "push," component that reacts against the major-party alternatives to explain third-party activist support. In a variety of tests, we find strong evidence that potential activists were motivated by both push and pull factors in 1992 and 1996. For example, on the issues, Perot attracted support because of issue proximity to him, and from activists who felt that the Reform Party shared their most important policy priorities. At the same time, supporters were activated for Perot by their conviction that the best major-party alternative was remote from their interests, by the lack of choice between the Democratic and Republican candidates on the issues, and by the perception that the major parties did not share their issue priorities. This model of support serves as a basis for understanding the decline in support for Perot between 1992 and 1996. In addition, we draw on our work on nomination candidacies in the major parties to show that carryover and spillover effects linked to mobilization by Perot in 1992 can help to explain movement by supporters into the Republican Party in 1994 and 1996. We seek support to continue our work on the Reform Party through the 2000 election. The design calls for continuing our 1992-94-96 panel of potential Perot activists through the 2000 election. We also have two fresh Reform samples that began in 1996 and that we use as the basis of a new panel in 2000: a national sample of Reform contributors, and a national sample of participants in the Perot-Lamm "primary by mail" conducted by the Party in August, 1996. In 1996, we also conducted surveys of DNC and RNC contributors that give us directly comparable national samples to the Reform contributor survey. We panel back to both of the Reform samples and the two major-party samples immediately after the 2000 election. These data collections give us unprecedented access to an historic third-party movement at a critical point when it faces the first election following Perot's hegemony over the Party. By extending the study, we are able to examine the development and institutionalization of the Reform Party, or its decline and demise. In any event, we can study the involvement of 1996 Reform supporters in subsequent major-party campaigns, and the effect of the Reform Party on the two major parties.

1992- 1996年的选举周期出现了几个引人注目的发展：1992年，罗斯·佩罗获得了内战以来第二大第三党选票; 1994年，共和党40年来首次赢得了众议院和参议院的多数席位; 1996年，改革党成为佩罗运动的制度延伸。 在第二次竞选中，佩罗的得票率下降到8%多一点，但他仍然成为共和党成立以来第一位在连续两次总统选举中得票率超过5%的第三方候选人。根据我们对这些选举的研究所完成的工作，我们得出结论，这些引人注目的事件是密切相关的。 佩罗1992年的选区为主要政党提供了一个几乎无法抗拒的机会目标，共和党人能够比Decemorats更成功地利用这个机会，特别是在1994年。 通过阐述和检验第三方支持的理论，并将其与主要政党的变革联系起来，我们开发了微观行为证据来解释第三方运动（如佩罗的运动）如何带来主要政党的变革。简而言之，该理论假设了对第三方候选人的吸引力所产生的积极或“拉动”成分，以及对主要政党替代方案做出反应的消极或“推动”成分，以解释第三方活动家的支持。 在各种各样的测试中，我们发现了强有力的证据表明，在1992年和1996年，潜在的积极分子受到了推拉因素的激励。 例如，在这些问题上，佩罗赢得了支持，因为他与这些问题关系密切，也得到了一些活动家的支持，他们认为改革党与他们有着共同的最重要的政策优先事项。 与此同时，佩罗的支持者们也被激励起来，因为他们坚信最好的主要政党选择离他们的利益很远，因为在这些问题上民主党和共和党候选人之间缺乏选择，而且他们认为主要政党在这些问题上的优先次序并不一致。这种支持模式可以作为理解1992年至1996年间佩罗支持率下降的基础。 此外，我们利用我们在主要政党的提名候选人的工作表明，结转和溢出效应与动员佩罗在1992年可以帮助解释运动的支持者进入共和党在1994年和1996年。我们寻求支持，以便在2000年选举期间继续我们关于改革党的工作。 设计要求继续我们的1992-94-96小组的潜在佩罗活动家通过2000年的选举。 我们也有两个新的改革样本，开始于1996年，我们使用作为一个新的小组在2000年的基础：一个全国样本的改革贡献者，和一个全国样本的参与者在佩罗-拉姆“主要通过邮件”由党在1996年8月进行。 1996年，我们还对民主党全国委员会和共和党全国委员会的撰稿人进行了调查，使我们能够直接与改革撰稿人调查进行比较。 2000年大选后，我们立即回顾了两个改革样本和两个主要政党样本。这些数据收集让我们前所未有地接触到一个历史性的第三党运动在一个关键点时，它面临着第一次选举后，佩罗的霸权党。 通过延伸研究，我们可以考察改革党的发展和制度化，或者它的衰落和消亡。 无论如何，我们可以研究1996年改革支持者参与随后的主要政党竞选的情况，以及改革党对两个主要政党的影响。