Collaborative Research on the Reform Party and Major Party Change

改革党与主要政党变革的合作研究

• 批准号: 9987446
• 负责人: Walter Stone
• 金额: $ 9.6万
• 依托单位: University of Colorado at Boulder
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2000
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2000-03-01 至 2001-10-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9987446&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Reform; Party; Major

The 1992-96 election cycle saw several remarkable developments: in 1992, Ross Perot received the second largest third-party vote since the Civil War; in 1994, the Republicans won majorities of the House and Senate for the first time in forty years; and in 1996, the Reform Party emerged as the institutional extension of the Perot movement. In his second run, Perot's vote declined to just over eight percent, but he still managed to become the first third-party candidate to win more than five percent in two successive presidential elections since the formation of the Republican Party. Based on work completed from our research on these elections, we conclude that these remarkable events are closely related. Perot's 1992 constituency presented the major parties with a nearly irresistible target of opportunity, which the Republicans were able to capitalize on much more successfully than were the Decemorats, especially in 1994. By articulating and testing a theory of third-party support and linking it to major-party change, we have developed micro-behavioral evidence to explain how a third-party movement, such as that of Perot, can bring about major-party change. Briefly, the theory posits a positive, or "pull," component that results from attraction to the third-party candidate, and a negative, or "push," component that reacts against the major-party alternatives to explain third-party activist support. In a variety of tests, we find strong evidence that potential activists were motivated by both push and pull factors in 1992 and 1996. For example, on the issues, Perot attracted support because of issue proximity to him, and from activists who felt that the Reform Party shared their most important policy priorities. At the same time, supporters were activated for Perot by their conviction that the best major-party alternative was remote from their interests, by the lack of choice between the Democratic and Republican candidates on the issues, and by the perception that the major parties did not share their issue priorities. This model of support serves as a basis for understanding the decline in support for Perot between 1992 and 1996. In addition, we draw on our work on nomination candidacies in the major parties to show that carryover and spillover effects linked to mobilization by Perot in 1992 can help to explain movement by supporters into the Republican Party in 1994 and 1996. We seek support to continue our work on the Reform Party through the 2000 election. The design calls for continuing our 1992-94-96 panel of potential Perot activists through the 2000 election. We also have two fresh Reform samples that began in 1996 and that we use as the basis of a new panel in 2000: a national sample of Reform contributors, and a national sample of participants in the Perot-Lamm "primary by mail" conducted by the Party in August, 1996. In 1996, we also conducted surveys of DNC and RNC contributors that give us directly comparable national samples to the Reform contributor survey. We panel back to both of the Reform samples and the two major-party samples immediately after the 2000 election. These data collections give us unprecedented access to an historic third-party movement at a critical point when it faces the first election following Perot's hegemony over the Party. By extending the study, we are able to examine the development and institutionalization of the Reform Party, or its decline and demise. In any event, we can study the involvement of 1996 Reform supporters in subsequent major-party campaigns, and the effect of the Reform Party on the two major parties.

1992年至1996年的选举周期出现了几项引人注目的进展：1992年，罗斯·佩罗（Ross Perot）获得了自内战以来第二多的第三方选票；1994年，共和党四十年来首次赢得众议院和参议院的多数席位；1996年，改革党成为佩罗运动的制度性延伸。在第二次竞选中，佩罗的支持率下降到8%多一点，但他仍然成为共和党成立以来第一位在连续两届总统选举中赢得5%以上选票的第三党候选人。根据我们对这些选举的研究完成的工作，我们得出结论，这些重大事件是密切相关的。1992年，佩罗的选区为主要政党提供了几乎不可抗拒的机会，共和党人比民主党人更成功地利用了这一机会，尤其是在1994年。通过阐述和测试第三方支持理论，并将其与主要政党的变化联系起来，我们开发了微观行为证据来解释像佩罗这样的第三方运动是如何带来主要政党的变化的。简而言之，该理论假设了一个积极的或“拉”的成分，这是由于对第三方候选人的吸引力，以及一个消极的或“推”的成分，这是对主要政党替代方案的反应，以解释第三方活动家的支持。在各种测试中，我们发现强有力的证据表明，在1992年和1996年，潜在的积极分子受到推和拉因素的激励。例如，在这些问题上，佩罗赢得了支持，因为他在问题上与他很接近，并且从那些认为改革党与他们分享最重要的政策优先事项的活动人士那里获得了支持。与此同时，佩罗的支持者之所以支持佩罗，是因为他们确信，最好的主要政党替代方案与他们的利益相距甚远，因为在这些问题上，民主党和共和党候选人之间缺乏选择，而且他们认为，主要政党在这些问题上没有共同的优先事项。这种支持模式可以作为理解1992年至1996年期间佩罗支持率下降的基础。此外，我们利用我们对主要政党提名候选人的研究表明，1992年佩罗动员相关的延续和溢出效应可以帮助解释1994年和1996年支持者进入共和党的运动。我们寻求支持，继续改革党的工作，直至2000年大选。这个计划要求在2000年的选举中继续我们1992-94-96年的潜在佩罗积极分子小组。我们还有两个1996年开始的新的改革样本，我们将其作为2000年新小组的基础：一个是改革贡献者的全国样本，另一个是1996年8月该党进行的佩罗-拉姆“邮寄初选”的全国参与者样本。1996年，我们还对民主党全国委员会和共和党全国委员会的捐助者进行了调查，这为我们提供了与改革捐助者调查直接可比的国家样本。我们回顾了改革样本和2000年大选后的两个主要政党样本。这些数据收集让我们前所未有地了解了一个历史性的第三党运动，在这个关键时刻，它面临着佩罗在党内的霸权地位之后的第一次选举。通过扩展研究，我们可以审视改革党的发展和制度化，或者它的衰落和消亡。无论如何，我们可以研究1996年改革支持者在随后的主要政党竞选中的参与情况，以及改革党对两大政党的影响。