Collaborative Research: The Effect of Changes in Wages on Economic Perceptions and Voting: An Improved Micro-Level Foundation for Economic Voting

这项研究检验了一种理论，即选民看经济的不同方面，以确定现任政府管理经济的能力如何有利于选民的自身利益，他们投票是根据这一计算，而不是考虑经济的总体增长率或选民的个人财务状况。调查人员假设，选民关注以下人群的工资或就业水平的变化：从事类似职业的人；具有类似教育水平的人；以及与选民处于同一行业的人，以确定经济表现如何符合选民的利益。因此，研究人员提供了一个个人层面的行为模型，与对投票选择对经济表现的重要性的综合观察一致。调查人员辩称，选民是自私自利的，他们根据在任者管理经济的能力来评估在任者是否符合选民的自身利益。因此，选民将优先考虑归功于政府的经济增长水平，以及现任总统的分配影响。克莱默(1983)的论点被重复了一遍，即选民将自己的钱包视为现任总统能力或现任总统的分配倾向的衡量标准，这将是无效的。选民的钱包是生命周期效应、努力和其他特殊因素的函数--这些因素将使政府引导的收入变化相形见绌。这一论点的扩展是指出，对于选民来说，看总体宏观经济将掩盖所有经济内部和分配的差异。这将包括基于技能的变化、基于教育的变化、部门变化和区域变化。因此，得出的结论是，选民可以用来确定现任政府管理经济以有利于选民自身利益的最佳策略是观察与选民具有相关经济特征的个人的经济表现。调查人员使用人口普查局当前的人口调查离职轮换文件估计不同选民群体的工资。这些客观经济措施的影响涉及以下方面：选民通过消费者态度和行为调查和全国选举研究对经济的评价；选民通过测量总统受欢迎程度的调查工具对现任总统的评价；以及选民通过全国选举研究进行的投票选择。通过使用比以前使用的关于个人经济状况的更丰富的信息的数据集，并将其与调查人员提供的理论相结合，该项目能够推进经济投票微观基础的技术水平。

This research tests the theory that voters look at distinct aspects of the economy to determine how well the incumbent administration manages the economy the benefit the voters' self-interests, and they vote on that calculation, rather than consideration of the overall growth rate of the economy or of the voter's personal financial condition. The investigators postulate that voters look at changes in the wages, or chnges int he level of employment, of: people in similar occupations; people with similar levels of education; and people in the same industry as the voter to determine how well the economy performs in the voter's interest. Thus, the investigators offer a model of individual-level behavior consistent with aggregate observations of the importance on economic performance on vote choice. The investigators argue that voters are self-interested, and that they evaluate the incumbent based o how well the incumbent manages the economy towards the voters' self-interest. Thus, voters would have preferences over both the level of economic growth credited to the administration, and to the distributive impact of the incumbent. Kramer's argument (1983) is repeated that it would be inefficient for voters to look at their own pocketbook as a measure of the incumbent's competence or the incumbents' distributve tendencies. The pocketbook of the voter is a function of life-cycle effects, effort, and other idiosyncratic factors -- which would dwarf government-induced change in income. The argument is extended by pointing out that for voters to look at the aggregate macro-economy would mask all intra-economy, distributive variation. This would include skill-based variation, education-based variation, sectoral variation, and regional variation. Thus, it is concluded that the best strategy, which a voter could employ to determine how well the incumbent administration manages the economy to benefit the voter's self-interest, is to look at the economic performance of individuals who share relevant economic characteristics with the voter. The investigators estimate wages of different groups of voters using the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation files. The impact of these objective economic measures is examined with respect to: voters' evaluations of the economy through the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior and the National Election Study; voters' evaluations of the incumbent through survey instruments measuring presidential popularity; and voters' vote choices through the National Election Study. By using a dataset with richer information on the economic circumstances of individuals than used previously, and combining this with the theory offered by the investigators, the project is able to advance the state of the art of the micro-foundations of economic voting.