Collaborative Research: Empirical Analyses of Competitive Bidding

合作研究：竞争性招标的实证分析

• 批准号: 0079495
• 负责人: Han Hong
• 金额: $ 10.99万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2000
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2000-07-15 至 2003-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0079495&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Empirical; Analyses; Competitive

This proposed project consists of four empirical studies of competitive bidding behavior in several different auction markets. We develop a sequence of estimation and testing methods for bidding models, focusing on common value environments where the competing bidders are assumed to be differentially and incompletely informed about the value of the object(s) for which they are vying. The second study involves on-going joint research with Professor Phil Haile in the University of Wisconsin.A distinguishing feature of common value auctions, and a recurring theme in the analysis, is the winner's curse, which arises because the winner in an auction will tend to be the bidder who has "overestimated" the object's value the most. Rational bidders will avoid this undesirable outcome by bidding less aggressively. In the first project, we use data from procurement auctions run by the New Jersey Department of Transportation in order to address whether equilibrium bidding becomes more or less aggressive as the number of bidders increases and, therefore, whether attracting additional bidders will lower equilibrium procurement costs.In the second project, we formalize a nonparametric statistical test for the presence of common value elements by exploring the variation in the number of bidders which is present in many auction datasets. This test relies on detecting the effects of the winner's curse, which are present only in common value environments.In the first two projects, a symmetric model of competitive bidding has been assumed. In the third project, we extend our estimation method to allow for ex ante bidder asymmetries and use this method to analyze the auctions used by the United States Department of the Interior since the late 1950s to allocate offshore oil and gas drilling rights in the outer continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico.While the first three studies focus on bidding in single-object common value auctions, the fourth project is an empirical analysis of double auction markets. Using data from milk quota auctions administered in the province of Ontario, Canada, we investigate, first, whether common values are present in these auctions (arising from producer uncertainty and private information about future milk prices) and, if so, whether the implied winner's curse is leading to more conservative bidding for producers who wish to transact large amounts of quota. Second, we measure the extent of market power possessed by large bidders in this market by developing a structural model of bidding behavior.The results of this research have potentially important policy implications given the prevalence of auctions as allocation mechanisms in practice. Government agencies at the municipal, state, and federal levels routinely procure services through a competitive bidding process. Similarly, across many states, there are plans to allow for competitive demand and supply bidding in deregulated electricity markets via uniform-price double auctions. Finally, agricultural subsidies--of which milk production quotas are one example--are a perennial bone of contention amongst the G7 countries. While the fourth project does not directly address the desirability of these subsidies, it does shed light on the efficiency of a competitive bidding environment in allocating these subsidies. More broadly, the ideas of increasing competition and lower prices are often inseparable in competi-tion and regulatory policy, but this research highlights the possibility that when market participants have imperfect information about their environment, increasing competition might be associated with higher prices, if winner's curse effects are strong enough. In short, there appear to be important efficiency and revenue lessons to be learned from the proposed projects.

本项目包含四个对不同拍卖市场竞价行为的实证研究。我们为竞标模型开发了一系列评估和测试方法，重点关注共同的价值环境，在这种环境中，竞标者被假设对他们争夺的对象的价值有不同的和不完全的了解。第二项研究涉及与威斯康辛大学的菲尔·海尔教授正在进行的联合研究。普通价值拍卖的一个显著特征，也是分析中反复出现的主题，是赢家的诅咒，这是因为拍卖中的赢家往往是“高估”物品价值最多的竞标者。理性的竞标者会通过不那么激进的出价来避免这种不希望出现的结果。在第一个项目中，我们使用了新泽西州运输部采购拍卖的数据，以解决随着投标人数量的增加，平衡投标是否变得更激进或更不激进，因此，吸引更多的投标人是否会降低平衡采购成本。在第二个项目中，我们通过探索许多拍卖数据集中存在的竞标者数量的变化，形式化了共同价值元素存在的非参数统计检验。该测试依赖于检测胜利者诅咒的影响，这种影响只存在于普通值环境中。在前两个项目中，我们假设了一个对称的竞标模型。在第三个项目中，我们扩展了我们的估计方法，以允许事前投标人不对称，并使用该方法分析了自20世纪50年代末以来美国内政部用于分配墨西哥湾外大陆架海上石油和天然气钻探权的拍卖。前三个研究集中于单对象共同价值拍卖中的竞价，而第四个项目则是对双重拍卖市场的实证分析。利用加拿大安大略省管理的牛奶配额拍卖的数据，我们首先调查了这些拍卖中是否存在共同的价值（源于生产商对未来牛奶价格的不确定性和私人信息），如果是这样，是否隐含的赢家诅咒导致希望交易大量配额的生产商更保守地竞标。其次，我们通过开发投标行为的结构模型来衡量大型投标人在这个市场中拥有的市场力量的程度。鉴于拍卖作为分配机制在实践中的普遍存在，本研究的结果具有潜在的重要政策含义。市、州和联邦各级政府机构通常通过竞争性招标程序采购服务。同样，在许多州，计划允许在放松管制的电力市场上通过统一价格的双重拍卖进行竞争性需求和供应竞标。最后，农业补贴——牛奶生产配额就是一个例子——是七国集团国家之间长期争论的焦点。虽然第四个项目没有直接解决这些补贴的可取性问题，但它确实揭示了竞争性招标环境在分配这些补贴方面的效率。更广泛地说，在竞争和监管政策中，增加竞争和降低价格的想法往往是不可分割的，但这项研究强调了这样一种可能性，即当市场参与者对其环境的信息不完全时，如果赢家的诅咒效应足够强，增加竞争可能与更高的价格有关。简而言之，似乎可以从拟议的项目中吸取重要的效率和收入教训。