CAREER: Multiple Actors, Competing Risks: State Supreme Court Justices and the Policy Making (Unmaking) Game of Judicial Review

这个项目探讨了美国州最高法院大法官投票的策略性和真诚性。 这项研究将特别调查司法审查的确定案情阶段和根据案情作出决定阶段。 几个假设将被测试：1）是否制度规则，使报复更有可能影响法官的可能性投票战略; 2）是否战略行为的变化，以应对联邦-州关系的变化，并在不同程度的显着性的法律领域;和3）是否法官的竞争风险是由多个演员谁构成的选举和政策威胁，以国家最高法院法官。 11年来州最高法院判决的案件将在四个司法审查案件领域（竞选和选举、工人赔偿、失业赔偿和福利）收集。还将收集1994-2004年期间每年法官传记特征、国家精英和公民意识形态以及制度规则、宪法设计和其他国家和法院特征的数据。 除了这些数据之外，还将对美国12个州的州最高法院法官、立法机构成员和州长进行访谈，这些州的制度规则、正式的立法-司法关系和政治背景各不相同。

This project explores the question of whether American state supreme court justices vote strategically or sincerely. The study will investigate, in particular, the agenda-setting stage and the decision-on-the-merits stage of judicial review. Several hypotheses will be tested: 1) whether institutional rules that make retaliation more likely affects judges' likelihood of voting strategically; 2) whether strategic behavior varies in response to changes in federal-state relations and across areas of law with varying degrees of saliency; and 3) whether competing risks for judges are created by multiple actors who pose electoral and policy threats to state supreme court justices. Cases from eleven years of state supreme court decisions will be collected in four areas of judicial review cases (campaign and elections, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and welfare). Data also will be collected on judge biographical characteristics, state elite and citizen ideology, as well as institutional rules, constitutional designs, and other state and court characteristics for each year during the 1994-2004 period. In addition to these data, interviews will be conducted with state supreme court justices, members of the legislature, and the state governor in twelve American states with variation across institutional rules, formalized legislative-judicial relations, and political contexts.