Financial Institutions for an Unstable World

应对不稳定世界的金融机构

• 批准号: 0095109
• 负责人: Douglas Gale
• 金额: $ 22.53万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2001-06-01 至 2004-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0095109&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Financial; Institutions; Unstable; World

There is a growing awareness that globalization, particularly the opening up of previously closed financial systems to global markets. has the potential to increase the exposure of financial systems to new and greater risks. The classical theory of risk sharing treats risks as exogenous (e.g., as states of nature). The new risks associated with globalization are largely endogenous. The traditional tools of financial economics can be used to describe and analyze these risks, but new models and new kinds of analysis are needed. Economists are now in a position to address questions about the optimal design and regulation of potentially unstable financial systems. This project addresses several problems in the area of economic policy, regulation and institutional design arising out of the recent work on financial crises.One difference between this work and much of the rest of the literature is that this project focuses on the microeconomic properties of financial institutions and markets that are crucial for understanding the phenomenon of financial fragility and endogenous instability. For the most part, first-generation models of financial crises analyze the behavior of a single representative bank, are partial equilibrium in nature and consist of a contracting problem followed by a coordination problem. In order to understand the origins of financial crises, we need models that describe complex, decentralized financial systems comprising both financial institutions and financial markets. This project develops such models of complex financial systems and uses this approach to explore four issues: optimal provision of liquidity when financial intermediaries are opaque; the relationship between aggregate uncertainty, financial fragility, and contagion; the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices; and the design of optimal currency areas.

人们日益认识到，全球化，特别是将以前封闭的金融体系向全球市场开放，有可能增加金融系统面临的新的和更大的风险。经典的风险分担理论将风险视为外生风险（例如，作为自然状态）。与全球化有关的新风险主要是内在的。传统的金融经济学工具可以用来描述和分析这些风险，但需要新的模型和新的分析。经济学家现在能够解决有关潜在不稳定金融体系的最佳设计和监管问题。本项目研究的是最近关于金融危机的研究中出现的经济政策、监管和制度设计领域的若干问题，与其他文献的一个不同之处在于，本项目侧重于对理解金融脆弱性和内生不稳定现象至关重要的金融机构和市场的微观经济特性。 在大多数情况下，第一代金融危机模型分析的是一家代表性银行的行为，本质上是部分均衡的，由一个契约问题和一个协调问题组成。 为了理解金融危机的起源，我们需要一个模型来描述复杂的、分散的金融系统，包括金融机构和金融市场。 本项目开发了复杂金融系统的模型，并使用这种方法来探讨四个问题：当金融中介不透明时，流动性的最佳提供;总体不确定性，金融脆弱性和传染性之间的关系;货币政策和资产价格之间的关系;以及最佳货币区的设计。