Financial Markets and Financial Intermediaries

金融市场和金融中介机构

• 批准号: 9422194
• 负责人: Douglas Gale
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1995-06-01 至 1997-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9422194&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Financial; Markets; Intermediaries

9422194 This project advances our understanding of industrial organization in three areas: financial markets and financial intermediation, the timing of investment decisions, and general equilibrium with incomplete information. The first part of the project studies the striking differences between the financial systems of different countries. In the U.S., for example, financial markets are highly developed; in other countries such as Germany, intermediaries play a much larger role. These cross- country differences raise questions about the optimality of different financial systems and the costs and benefits of convergence. The object of this study is to compare the relative performance of financial markets and intermediaries in providing risk sharing, information, and allocative services. The work involves developing models of intermediation and comparing their welfare properties with those of financial markets. The second part of the project studies the timing of business investment decisions. When making investment decisions, firms often have an incentive to delay in order to gather information about what other firms are going to do. This leads to strategic behavior, since every firm prefers to make its commitment after others have made theirs. This project shows how endogenous delay in business investment decisions can prolong recessions and increase the amplitude of fluctuations in economic activity, and produce cycles in the introduction of new technology. An important function of the market system is to economize on the amount of information required to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. However, markets may not function well when some agents are able to exploit private information. The third part of the project builds on and extends earlier work which modeled equilibrium in market systems with private information. Two applications, one concerning financial regulation and one concerning securitization of contracts, motivate the deve lopment and analysis of a richer class of models to investigate how well the market system copes with private information in these environments.

9422194这个项目在三个方面促进了我们对产业组织的理解：金融市场和金融中介、投资决策的时机和不完全信息下的一般均衡。项目的第一部分研究了不同国家金融体系之间的显著差异。例如，在美国，金融市场高度发达；在德国等其他国家，中介机构发挥的作用要大得多。这些跨国差异引发了关于不同金融体系的最优性以及趋同的成本和收益的问题。本研究的目的是比较金融市场和中介机构在提供风险分担、信息和配置服务方面的相对绩效。这项工作包括开发中介模型，并将其福利属性与金融市场的福利属性进行比较。项目的第二部分研究商业投资决策的时机。在做出投资决策时，公司往往有拖延的动机，以便收集其他公司将要做什么的信息。这导致了战略行为，因为每个公司都喜欢在别人做出承诺之后做出自己的承诺。本项目表明，企业投资决策的内生延迟如何能够延长衰退，增加经济活动波动的幅度，并在引进新技术方面产生周期。市场制度的一个重要功能是节省实现资源有效分配所需的信息量。然而，当一些代理人能够利用私人信息时，市场可能无法正常运作。该项目的第三部分建立并扩展了早期的工作，即在具有私人信息的市场系统中建模均衡。两个应用程序，一个涉及金融监管，一个涉及合同证券化，激发了更丰富的模型类的开发和分析，以调查市场系统如何在这些环境中处理私人信息。