Collaborative Research: The Art of Conversation

随着信息技术变得越来越普遍，现在决策者，如首席执行官和立法者，从具有不同专业领域的各种专家那里获得建议的可能性越来越大。传统观点认为，结果是，决策者会做出更好的决定。然而，这忽略了这样一个事实，即专家可能隐瞒或歪曲信息，希望以对他们有利的方向影响决策。因此，决策者需要考虑沟通的结构--对话--如何影响从专家那里获得的建议的信息量。这个项目调查沟通的结构如何影响决策的质量。项目的第一部分是关于不知情的决策者和知情的专家之间的对话。当专家在没有任何对话的情况下发送书面报告时，这会导致大量的信息损失。然而，决策者和专家之间的面对面交流会提高专家建议的信息量--即使决策者完全不知情。决策者和专家都从对话中受益。这让我们研究了以下问题：在面对面的会议中，可以可信地传递多少信息？有没有可能诱使专家充分披露他的信息？在许多情况下，决策者自己可能对决策的某些方面很了解。例如，一位企业家可能对其产品的增长前景有详细的了解，但仍需要金融专业知识才能将其公司上市。该项目的第二部分涉及在这种情况下的沟通--决策者和专家都有一些相关的信息。再一次，沟通的结构可能会严重影响交换的信息量。例如，在许多情况下，往返交流不会带来信息收益--即使决策者知情--我们确定了这些情况。这就引出了我们的问题：通过增加更多的交流，这种情况会得到改善吗？面对面的会议是否优于来回交流，比如通过电子邮件？第三部分是关于决策是多方面的，信息分散在许多“专家”专家之间的情况。例如，一项立法可能会同时影响就业和环境。不同的游说团体可能在上述每个领域都拥有专业知识。我们研究了为专家提供彼此交流的机会是否会提高他们建议的信息性。如果决策者也参与进来，情况会得到改善吗？如果专家的专业知识有重叠，情况会有所改善吗？

As information technology has become more widespread, it is now increasinglypossible for decision makers, such as CEOs and legislators, to obtain advice froma variety of experts with di!ering areas of expertise. Conventional wisdom suggeststhat, as a result, the decision maker will reach better decisions. This, however, ignoresthe fact that experts may withhold or distort information in the hope of influencingthe decision in a direction favorable to them. Thus, a decision maker needs to considerhow the structure of communication -- the conversation --affects how informative isthe advice received from experts. This project investigates how the structure ofcommunication a!ects the quality of decisions.The first part of the project concerns conversations between an uninformed deci-sion maker and an informed expert. When the expert sends a written report, unac-companied by any dialogue, this results in substantial information loss. A face-to-facemeeting between a decision maker and an expert, however, leads to an improvementin the informativeness of expert advice--even though the decision maker is completelyuninformed. Both the decision maker and the expert benefit from the conversation.This leads us to examine the following questions: How much information can be cred-ibly transmitted in a face-to-face meeting? Is it possible to induce the expert to fullydisclose his information?In many situations, the decision maker himself may be knowledgeable about someaspects of the decision. As an example, an entrepreneur may have detailed knowl-edge about the growth prospects of his product, but still require financial expertise intaking his company public. The second part of the project concerns communicationin such situations--where both the decision maker and the expert have some rele-vant information. Once again, the structure of communication can critically affectthe amount of information exchanged. For instance, there are many circumstanceswhere back-and-forth communication does not lead to information gains--even if thedecision maker is informed--and we identify these circumstances. This leads us toask the following questions: Is the situation improved by adding more rounds of com-munication? Is a face-to-face meeting superior to a back-and-forth exchange, such asvia E-mail?The third part concerns situations where decisions are multi-faceted and informa-tion is dispersed among many "specialist" experts. For instance, a piece of legislationmay impact both employment and the environment. Different lobbying groups arelikely to possess expertise in each of these areas. We study whether providing expertswith an opportunity to communicate with one another improves the informativenessof their advice. Is the situation improved if the decision maker also participates? Isthe situation improved if there is overlap in the experts' specialized knowledge?