ITR/PE (SES): Empirical Studies of Network Effects

ITR/PE (SES)：网络效应的实证研究

• 批准号: 0112527
• 负责人: Marc Rysman
• 金额: $ 6.73万
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2001-09-01 至 2003-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0112527&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: ITR; PE; SES; Empirical; Studies

A network effect exists when an agent values a good based on how many other agents use the good. For instance, consumers choosing between VHS and Beta VCR's are unlikely to choose based on superior technical performance. Instead, consumers choose the standard that other consumers choose, most likely in order to have access to a large library of pre-recorded movies. Network effects are present in many markets and are especially important for many high technology and information technology goods. Network goods can lead to market outcomes that present difficult problems for public policy. This project studies two such outcomes: The first is that a market can coordinate on a single proprietary good, leading to market power for the owner of the good. The second is that markets can fail to coordinate, so consumers are unsure of which standard will ultimately be adopted. Such confusion can lead to very slow adoption rates for new products. This project analyzes two specific industries that exhibit these problems. The project works through estimation issues that arise in the face of network effects and uses the results of the estimation to analyze the implications for government intervention into those markets, either by antitrust or standard setting. The first part of the project estimates the importance of a positive feedback loop in the market for Yellow Pages advertising. I estimate how much consumers prefer directories with more advertising and how much advertisers are willing to pay to advertise in a directory with more readers. I use resulting estimates to consider whether the market benefits from monopoly (which takes advantage of network effects) or oligopoly (which reduces market power). The preliminary estimates imply that a more competitive market is preferable. This result supports recent policy promoting competition in the directory market. Furthermore, techniques developed here could be usefully applied to other markets. For instance, just as consumers and advertisers prefer to coordinate on a single directory, consumers and software developers prefer to coordinate on a single operating system. A drawback of my results from the Yellow Pages market is that the estimates predict unreasonably high benefits from adding directories to the market. This problem is a common one when using discrete choice models. The second part of this project (which is joint work with Daniel Ackerberg, UCLA) proposes a new estimator that captures the fact that as products enter a market, products become more similar with regards to characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher. Our research presents structural justifications of the estimator as well as Monte Carlo studies of when the estimator is most appropriate. This estimator has many applications, and the application of this technique to the Yellow Pages market should lead to more accurate estimates, both of the strength of the network effect and of the welfare tradeoffs between competition and standardization.The third part of the project is joint work with Angelique Augereau (McKinsey) and Shane Greenstein (Kellogg). We analyze the introduction of high-speed modems and how the market failed to coordinate on a single standard. Originally, two competing but equivalent standards of 56K modems led to a situation in which consumers and Internet service providers had to coordinate their choice of modem technology. Overall, adoption was very slow and eventually, an industry group developed a single standard that was widely adopted. Our explanation of the slow initial adoption rate is that, in contrast to the incentives to coordinate, ISP's also have an incentive to differentiate across the two standards because doing so reduces price competition. Consumers then postpone adoption because they do not know which standard will "win". We develop a theoretical model that formalizes these points. In addition, preliminary empirical analysis suggests that, before the arrival of the new standard, adopting ISP choices were evenly distributed between the two standards even within individual markets. As our theory predicts, ISP's perfectly differentiated instead of coordinated. We use insights and results from the study of this market to discuss the competitive determination of adoption choice and implications for the benefits of intervention into a standards war.

当一个代理人根据有多少其他代理人使用该商品来评价一种商品时，就存在网络效应。 例如，消费者在VHS和Beta录像机之间进行选择，不太可能基于上级技术性能进行选择。 相反，消费者选择其他消费者选择的标准，最有可能是为了访问一个大型的预先录制的电影库。 网络效应存在于许多市场，对许多高技术和信息技术产品尤为重要。 网络商品可能导致市场结果，给公共政策带来难题。 本项目研究两个这样的结果：第一个是，市场可以协调一个单一的专有商品，导致市场力量的所有者的好。 第二，市场可能无法协调，因此消费者不确定最终将采用哪种标准。 这种混乱会导致新产品的采用率非常缓慢。 本项目分析了两个表现出这些问题的具体行业。 该项目通过网络效应所产生的估计问题进行工作，并使用估计结果分析政府干预这些市场的影响，无论是反垄断还是标准制定。 该项目的第一部分评估了黄页广告市场中积极反馈循环的重要性。我估计有多少消费者更喜欢有更多广告的目录，以及有多少广告商愿意支付广告在一个有更多读者的目录。 我使用由此产生的估计来考虑市场是否受益于垄断（利用网络效应）或寡头垄断（减少市场力量）。 初步估计表明，更有竞争力的市场是可取的。 这一结果支持最近的政策，促进目录市场的竞争。 此外，这里开发的技术可以有效地应用于其他市场。 例如，就像消费者和广告商更喜欢在单个目录上进行协调一样，消费者和软件开发人员也更喜欢在单个操作系统上进行协调。 我从黄页市场的结果的一个缺点是，估计预测不合理的高收益增加目录的市场。 这个问题在使用离散选择模型时很常见。 该项目的第二部分（与加州大学洛杉矶分校的丹尼尔阿克伯格合作）提出了一种新的估计方法，该方法可以捕捉到这样一个事实，即随着产品进入市场，产品在研究人员无法观察到的特征方面变得更加相似。 我们的研究提出了结构合理的估计，以及蒙特卡罗研究时，估计是最合适的。 这个估计器有很多应用，这种技术的应用，黄页市场应该导致更准确的估计，无论是网络效应的强度和竞争和标准化之间的福利权衡。该项目的第三部分是与安吉丽奥热罗（麦肯锡）和谢恩格林斯坦（凯洛格）的联合工作。 我们分析了高速调制解调器的引入以及市场如何未能在单一标准上协调一致。 最初，两种相互竞争但相当的56K调制解调器标准导致消费者和互联网服务提供商必须协调他们对调制解调器技术的选择。 总体而言，采用非常缓慢，最终，一个行业组织开发了一个被广泛采用的单一标准。我们对初始采用率缓慢的解释是，与协调的动机相反，ISP也有动机在两个标准之间进行区分，因为这样做会减少价格竞争。然后，消费者推迟采用，因为他们不知道哪一个标准会“获胜”。 我们开发了一个理论模型，正式这些点。 此外，初步的实证分析表明，在新标准到来之前，采用ISP的选择均匀分布在两个标准之间，甚至在个别市场。 正如我们的理论所预测的，ISP是完全分化的，而不是协调的。 我们使用的见解和结果，从这个市场的研究，讨论了竞争的决定，采用选择和干预的好处到一个标准战争的影响。