Semi-Structural Modeling of Empirical Auction Models

每年有数十亿美元的商品和服务通过拍卖获得。通过分析这些交易中产生的数据，可以获得关于拍卖设计等关键问题的关键见解。这些数据也可用于了解这些市场的竞争特征，并提供有关可能的串通行为和市场绩效的信息，这些信息反映在经济效率中。拍卖的“结构性”分析传统上是基于假设完全理性的博弈论模型。然而，拍卖实验的结果是普遍的和一致的：拍卖参与者的行为显着偏离理论规定。这种偏离的程度与结构分析的基本假设--完全理性--严重矛盾。这个建议的目的是弥合实验经济学和经验拍卖模型之间的差距。我们将明确允许投标人偏离固有的过于简化的“基准”理论模型的理论解决方案。这种偏离可能是非战略性的（错误），也可能是战略性的，因为它们反映了基准模型没有适当捕捉的现实因素。传统的出价功能，其中分配一个单一的出价球员的估值，被取代的出价的全概率分布，有条件的valuations.The建议开发业务的数值程序下，这一类新的“半结构”模型的出价分析，并解释其统计特性。在这个框架中开发的分析工具将被应用到几个现实生活中的情况：（1）拍卖数据，从木材销售在西北太平洋将进行分析，特别侧重于识别可能的串通行为。(2)将分析与格鲁吉亚学校牛奶采购有关的数据，其中可能会突出市场效率问题。(3)互联网拍卖，观察到的行为严重偏离标准理论处方，将被用来证明所开发的技术的解释力。这些实证研究有望为现实生活中的拍卖操作提供重要的新见解，并为拍卖设计中的相应调整提出建议。

Each year billions of dollars of goods and services are acquired through auctions. By analyzing data that are generated in these transactions, key insights can be obtained on critical issues such as auction design. The data also may be used to understand the competitive character of these markets and bring information to bear on possible collusive behavior and market performance as reflected in economic efficiency. "Structural" analysis of auctions traditionally is based on game theoretic models that assume perfect rationality. Yet, the findings from auction experiments are pervasive and consistent: The behavior of auction participant deviates significantly from theory prescriptions. The extent of deviation sharply contradicts the assumption of perfect rationality that is so fundamental to structural analysis. The objective of this proposal is to bridge the gap between experimental economics and empirical auction modeling. We will explicitly allow bidders to deviate from the theoretical solutions of an inherently oversimplified "benchmark" theory model. Such deviations could be non-strategic (mistakes), or they may be strategic in the sense that they reflect real-life factors that are not appropriately captured by the benchmark model. Traditional bid functions, which assign a single bid to a player's valuation, are replaced by a full probability distribution for bids, conditional on valuations.The proposal develops operational numerical procedures for the analysis of bids under this new class of "semi-structural" models and explains their statistical properties. The analytical tools developed in this framework will be applied to several real-life situations: (1) Auction data from timber sales in the Northwest Pacific will be analyzed, with a specific focus on the identification of possible collusive behavior. (2) Data related to school milk procurement in Georgia will be analyzed, where issues of market efficiency may be highlighted. (3) Internet auctions, where observed behavior sharply deviates from standard theory prescriptions, will be used to demonstrate the explanatory power of the techniques developed. These empirical studies are expected to provide critical new insights in the operations of real-life auctions and result in suggestions for corresponding adjustments in their design.