Survivable Trust for Critical Infrastructure

这项研究将调查基于安全协处理器构建的对等网络的设计。这个名为Marianas的网络将被设计为在互联网基础设施受到网络攻击时具有一定程度的弹性。安全协处理和对等技术的结合将创建一个分布式、可生存、可信赖的主干，使关键基础设施能够实现迄今不存在的功能。对于许多应用程序，Marianas节点必须高度可信。安全协处理器的内核必须确保应用程序不会相互干扰。在对路由基础设施进行网络攻击期间，Marianas必须保持连接。将开发满足不同用户、应用程序和信任需求的身份验证基础设施。这些问题的解决方案将借鉴安全执行、PKI、安全系统和网络系统评估技术。为了验证这些概念，将开发对候选解决方案进行编码的中间件，并将其安装在小型Marianas系统上。可以支持关键基础设施系统的更大的Marianas系统将被模拟，以评估它们的性能和面对网络攻击的弹性。

This research will investigate the design of a peer-to-peer network built around secure coprocessors. The network, named Marianas, will be designed to have a level of resiliency in the event of cyberattack on the Internet infrastructure. The combination of secure coprocessing and peer-to-peer technologies will create a distributed survivable trustworthy backbone which enables functionality for critical infrastructure that hitherto did not exist. A Marianas node must be highly trustworthy for many applications. The secure coprocessor's kernel must ensure that applications do not interfere with each other. Marianas must remain connected during a network cyberattack on the routing infrastructure. Authentication infrastructure for diverse user, application, and trust requirements will be developed.The solutions to these problems will draw on technologies for secure execution, PKI, secure systems, and networking systems evaluation. To prove these concepts, middle-ware will be developed that encodes the candidate solutions and will be installed on a small scale Marianas system. Much larger Marianas systems, which could support critical infrastructure systems, will be simulated to evaluate their performance, and resiliency in the face of network attack.