IUCRC Phase I: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES)

能源系统基础设施可信度中心（CITES）是一个新的第一阶段IUCRC，专注于网络弹性和能源系统可信度关键领域的研究问题（例如，电网发电、输电和配电），这些都广泛依赖于网络技术。CITES由三所大学组成（伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校、阿肯色州大学和佛罗里达国际大学），旨在推进研究和技术，解决未满足和服务不足的行业需求，以更好地保护能源系统。CITES将与其成员（紧急医疗服务办公室、能源供应商、国家实验室和行业协会）密切合作，通过开发研究，帮助确保国防安全，从而找到保护能源系统免受网络基础设施故障和攻击的实用方法。《濒危物种贸易公约》处理的基本问题涉及在这些“操作技术”系统的专门要求背景下的网络复原力，包括操作技术设备的异质性以及与更广泛使用的信息技术设备的整合。 该中心将专注于检测和快速响应对网络基础设施的攻击，从成功攻击的影响中快速恢复，降低修补操作系统的成本和风险，并确保设备之间的通信速度足够快，并且有足够的容量来支持操作。 CITES还将在增加国家的OT知识网络安全专业人员的劳动力方面发挥重要作用。研究方法包括系统分析，正式方法和其他数学，以及原型的经验评估。CITES的技术贡献包括知识创造、知识转移和利用伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校（UIUC）专门的OT系统测试平台的经验概念证明。能源供应商通过观察提高弹性的潜力而受益;设备制造商从经过验证的想法中受益，其他利益相关者从增加的知识中受益。IUUC的CITES研究围绕三个重点组织。第一个重点是理解安全性--开发理解系统安全属性的方法，包括组织和配置的分析，以及从系统中导出的数据的分析。安全性质的研究使系统的形式化表示和安全性证明得以发展。 数据分析的研究使解释数据的任务变得易于管理，并提供对系统行为的洞察和理解。第二个重点--边缘安全--关注子系统连接处存在的漏洞。该团队开发检测潜在和实际缺陷的方法。 该技术是根据特殊的安全需求量身定制的（例如，跨系统认证）。第三个推力-可用的安全技术-确保新的安全技术不会增加系统故障的风险，也不会违反任何系统的操作限制。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

The Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES), a new Phase I IUCRC, focuses on research issues in the critical area of cyber resilience and the trustworthiness of energy systems (e.g., electric grid generation, transmission, and distribution), which have an extensive dependence on cyber technology. Composed of three University sites (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, University of Arkansas, and Florida International University), CITES seeks to advance research and technologies that addresses unmet and underserved industry needs to better secure energy systems. In close partnership with its members (Offices of Emergency Medical Services, energy providers, national labs, and industry associations), CITES will help secure the national defense by developing research that leads to practical means of protecting energy systems against failure within and attacks upon their cyber infrastructures. The fundamental issues addressed by CITES concern cyber resilience in the context of the specialized requirements for these “operational technology” (OT) systems, issues which include the heterogeneity of OT equipment, and integration with much more widely used informational technology (IT) equipment. The Center will focus on detecting and quickly responding to attacks on the cyber infrastructure, rapidly recovering from the impacts of successful attacks, decreasing the costs and risks of patching operational systems, and ensuring that communication between devices happens fast enough and with enough volume to support operations. CITES will also serve an important role in augmenting the nation’s workforce in OT-knowledgeable cyber-security professionals.Research methodologies include system analysis, formal methods and other mathematics, and empirical evaluation of prototypes. CITES technical contributions include knowledge creation, knowledge transfer, and empirical proofs of concept that utilize University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC)’s specialized OT system testbed. Energy providers benefit by observing the potential for increased resilience; Equipment manufacturers benefit from proven ideas, and other stakeholders benefit from increased knowledge. CITES research at UIUC is organized around three thrusts. The first of these thrusts is understanding security - developing ways of understanding the security properties of a system, including analysis of organization and configurations, and of the data derived from the system. Research about security properties formalizes representations of systems and develops security proofs. Research in data analysis makes the task of interpreting data manageable and provides insights and understanding of system behaviors. The second thrust - security at the edge - has a focus on vulnerabilities that exist where subsystems join. The team develops means of detecting both potential and actualized flaws. The technology is tailored to the special security needs (e.g., cross-system authentication) that occur at the edge. The third thrust - useable security technologies - ensures that new security technologies do not increase the risk of the system failing and do not violate any of the system’s operating constraints.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.