IUCRC Phase I: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES)

能源系统基础设施可信赖性中心（CITES）是IUCRC新成立的一期项目，主要研究网络弹性和能源系统（如电网发电、输电和配电）可信赖性这一关键领域的研究问题，这些领域广泛依赖网络技术。CITES由三所大学（伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校、阿肯色大学和佛罗里达国际大学）组成，旨在推进研究和技术，解决未满足和服务不足的行业需求，以更好地保护能源系统。CITES将与其成员（紧急医疗服务办公室、能源供应商、国家实验室和行业协会）密切合作，通过开展研究，找到保护能源系统免遭网络基础设施内部故障和攻击的实用方法，帮助确保国防安全。CITES解决的基本问题涉及这些“操作技术”（OT）系统的专业要求背景下的网络弹性，这些问题包括OT设备的异构性，以及与更广泛使用的信息技术（IT）设备的集成。该中心将专注于检测和快速响应对网络基础设施的攻击，从成功攻击的影响中快速恢复，降低修补操作系统的成本和风险，并确保设备之间的通信足够快，有足够的容量来支持操作。CITES还将在扩大国家ot知识网络安全专业人员队伍方面发挥重要作用。研究方法包括系统分析、形式化方法和其他数学方法，以及原型的实证评价。CITES的技术贡献包括知识创造、知识转移和利用伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校（UIUC）专业OT系统测试平台的概念经验证明。能源供应商可以通过观察增强韧性的潜力而受益；设备制造商从经过验证的想法中受益，其他利益相关者从增加的知识中受益。ucuc的CITES研究主要围绕三个方面展开。第一个重点是理解安全性——开发理解系统安全属性的方法，包括对组织和配置的分析，以及对来自系统的数据的分析。对安全属性的研究形式化了系统的表示，并发展了安全证明。数据分析的研究使解释数据的任务易于管理，并提供对系统行为的见解和理解。第二个要点——边缘安全——关注子系统连接处存在的漏洞。该团队开发了检测潜在和实际缺陷的方法。该技术是针对发生在边缘的特殊安全需求（例如，跨系统身份验证）量身定制的。第三个推力——可用的安全技术——确保新的安全技术不会增加系统故障的风险，也不会违反系统的任何操作约束。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

The Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES), a new Phase I IUCRC, focuses on research issues in the critical area of cyber resilience and the trustworthiness of energy systems (e.g., electric grid generation, transmission, and distribution), which have an extensive dependence on cyber technology. Composed of three University sites (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, University of Arkansas, and Florida International University), CITES seeks to advance research and technologies that addresses unmet and underserved industry needs to better secure energy systems. In close partnership with its members (Offices of Emergency Medical Services, energy providers, national labs, and industry associations), CITES will help secure the national defense by developing research that leads to practical means of protecting energy systems against failure within and attacks upon their cyber infrastructures. The fundamental issues addressed by CITES concern cyber resilience in the context of the specialized requirements for these “operational technology” (OT) systems, issues which include the heterogeneity of OT equipment, and integration with much more widely used informational technology (IT) equipment. The Center will focus on detecting and quickly responding to attacks on the cyber infrastructure, rapidly recovering from the impacts of successful attacks, decreasing the costs and risks of patching operational systems, and ensuring that communication between devices happens fast enough and with enough volume to support operations. CITES will also serve an important role in augmenting the nation’s workforce in OT-knowledgeable cyber-security professionals.Research methodologies include system analysis, formal methods and other mathematics, and empirical evaluation of prototypes. CITES technical contributions include knowledge creation, knowledge transfer, and empirical proofs of concept that utilize University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC)’s specialized OT system testbed. Energy providers benefit by observing the potential for increased resilience; Equipment manufacturers benefit from proven ideas, and other stakeholders benefit from increased knowledge. CITES research at UIUC is organized around three thrusts. The first of these thrusts is understanding security - developing ways of understanding the security properties of a system, including analysis of organization and configurations, and of the data derived from the system. Research about security properties formalizes representations of systems and develops security proofs. Research in data analysis makes the task of interpreting data manageable and provides insights and understanding of system behaviors. The second thrust - security at the edge - has a focus on vulnerabilities that exist where subsystems join. The team develops means of detecting both potential and actualized flaws. The technology is tailored to the special security needs (e.g., cross-system authentication) that occur at the edge. The third thrust - useable security technologies - ensures that new security technologies do not increase the risk of the system failing and do not violate any of the system’s operating constraints.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.