A Game Theoretic Approach to the Design of Multi-Agent Process Planning Systems

多智能体流程规划系统设计的博弈论方法

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    0217974
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 财政年份:
    2002
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    2002-08-01 至 2007-07-31
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

The objective of this research project is to suggest how manufacturing process planning systems should be designed. In automated manufacturing, process planning is the intermediate step that transforms a design into an ordered list of instructions for fabrication. For instance, in machining, a block of homogeneous metal (the stock or initial workpiece) must be transformed by removing material appropriately. For each step, the position of the workpiece, how it is held in place (fixturing), the specific tool to be used, the tool access direction, and the precise tool path must be specified. A computer aided process planning system takes a computer file defining the design in a standard format---the output of a computer aided design system---and finds computerized instructions for computer assisted manufacturing equipment to make the desired artifact. Increasingly, such process planning systems contain multiple artificially intelligent agents (or distributed decision makers). Process planners (and multi-agent systems in general) define particular games. The examination of such games helps one to understand how process planners and multi-agent systems work, why they can fail, and how they can be improved. Game-theoretic mechanism design analyzes how games can be designed so that the desired outcomes arise as equilibria in the games. The proposed research will first use existing results in game theory and mechanism design to study process planners and multi-agent systems. Then new results will be derived for network and distributed games and the potential disaggregation of agents will be analyzed. The goal is to establish rigorous theoretical principles, based on strategic optimization behavior, to guide the design of multi-agent process planning systems and multi-agent systems in general.If successful, this research project will provide principles to improve the design of process planning systems. Process planning can be time-consuming and expensive; when it fails, it can lead to further costs and delays due to redesign. Moreover, process planning is a crucial step in a manufacturing industry (machining) that typically represents about five percent of gross domestic product in developed economies. Hence, it is important to design process planning systems well, so that they successfully find feasible---and, ideally, good, where "good'' means relatively inexpensive to manufacture to tolerance specifications---process plans quickly on average when the design is manufacturable (and don't waste excessive amounts of time and resources if the design is not manufacturable). Broader impacts include involvement of students (including those from underrepresented groups) in this research and the initiation of a new course at the University of Minnesota on game theory for engineers. Moreover, the project is inherently interdisciplinary and involves novel applications of game theory in manufacturing.
本研究项目的目的是提出如何设计制造工艺计划系统的建议。在自动化制造中,工艺规划是将设计转换为用于制造的有序指令列表的中间步骤。例如,在机械加工中,必须通过适当地去除材料来对一块均匀的金属(原料或初始工件)进行变形。对于每一步,必须指定工件的位置、如何将其固定到位(夹具)、要使用的特定刀具、刀具接近方向和精确的刀具路径。计算机辅助工艺设计系统以标准格式-计算机辅助设计系统的输出--获取定义设计的计算机文件,并为计算机辅助制造设备找到制造所需人工制品的计算机化指令。这样的工艺规划系统越来越多地包含多个人工智能代理(或分布式决策者)。工艺计划者(和一般的多智能体系统)定义特定的游戏。对这类游戏的检查有助于理解工艺计划器和多代理系统是如何工作的,为什么它们会失败,以及如何改进它们。博弈论机制设计分析了如何设计博弈,使期望的结果在博弈中作为均衡出现。建议的研究将首先利用博弈论和机制设计的现有成果来研究工艺计划者和多智能体系统。然后,将得到新的结果,用于网络和分布式博弈,并将分析潜在的代理解聚。本研究的目标是建立基于战略优化行为的严谨理论原则,指导多智能体工艺设计系统和多智能体系统的总体设计,如果研究成功,将为改进工艺设计系统提供指导原则。工艺规划可能既耗时又昂贵;当工艺规划失败时,可能会由于重新设计而导致进一步的成本和延误。此外,工艺规划是制造业(机械加工)的关键一步,制造业通常占发达经济体国内生产总值的5%左右。因此,重要的是要设计好工艺计划系统,使它们成功地找到可行的-理想情况下,好的,理想情况下,好的意味着制造符合公差规范的成本相对较低-当设计可制造时(如果设计不能制造,不要浪费过多的时间和资源),平均而言,工艺计划是快速的。更广泛的影响包括学生(包括那些代表人数不足的群体)参与这项研究,以及明尼苏达大学为工程师开设的一门新的博弈论课程。此外,该项目本身就是跨学科的,涉及到博弈论在制造中的新颖应用。

项目成果

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Beth Allen其他文献

Mass spectral analysis of a protein complex using single-chain antibodies selected on a peptide target: applications to functional genomics.
使用针对肽靶标选择的单链抗体对蛋白质复合物进行质谱分析:在功能基因组学中的应用。
  • DOI:
    10.1006/jmbi.2000.4070
  • 发表时间:
    2000
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    5.6
  • 作者:
    Robert W. Siegel;Beth Allen;P. Pavlík;James D. Marks;Andrew Bradbury;Andrew Bradbury
  • 通讯作者:
    Andrew Bradbury
General equilibrium with information sales
  • DOI:
    10.1007/bf00134168
  • 发表时间:
    1986-07-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0.600
  • 作者:
    Beth Allen
  • 通讯作者:
    Beth Allen
Market games with asymmetric information: the core
  • DOI:
    10.1007/s00199-005-0070-6
  • 发表时间:
    2006-01-24
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    1.100
  • 作者:
    Beth Allen
  • 通讯作者:
    Beth Allen
On the definition of differentiated products in the real world
  • DOI:
    10.1007/s00199-004-0498-0
  • 发表时间:
    2005-01-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    1.100
  • 作者:
    Beth Allen
  • 通讯作者:
    Beth Allen
A remark on a social choice problem
  • DOI:
    10.1007/bf00179094
  • 发表时间:
    1996-01-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0.800
  • 作者:
    Beth Allen
  • 通讯作者:
    Beth Allen

Beth Allen的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('Beth Allen', 18)}}的其他基金

SGER: An Axiomatic Approach to Probabilistic Tolerancing
SGER:概率公差的公理方法
  • 批准号:
    0540440
  • 财政年份:
    2005
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
A Theoretical Approach to Geometric Design and Manufacturability
几何设计和可制造性的理论方法
  • 批准号:
    0070257
  • 财政年份:
    2000
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
SGER: A Theoretical Approach to Engineering Design
SGER:工程设计的理论方法
  • 批准号:
    9816144
  • 财政年份:
    1998
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
POWRE: Topics in Economic Theory: The Timing of Transactions and Firm Formation
POWRE:经济理论主题:交易的时机和公司形成
  • 批准号:
    9753139
  • 财政年份:
    1997
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Market Games with Asymmetric Information
信息不对称的市场博弈
  • 批准号:
    9309854
  • 财政年份:
    1993
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Alternative Representations of Information in Microeconomic Systems
微观经济系统中信息的替代表示
  • 批准号:
    8821442
  • 财政年份:
    1989
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing grant
Alternative Representations of Information in Microeconomic Systems (Information Science)
微观经济系统中信息的替代表示(信息科学)
  • 批准号:
    8520584
  • 财政年份:
    1986
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Alternative Representations of Information in Microeconomic Systems (Information Science)
微观经济系统中信息的替代表示(信息科学)
  • 批准号:
    8314096
  • 财政年份:
    1984
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
The Structure and Distribution of Preferences
偏好的结构和分布
  • 批准号:
    7907228
  • 财政年份:
    1979
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Alternative Representations of Information in Microeconomic Systems
微观经济系统中信息的替代表示
  • 批准号:
    7918464
  • 财政年份:
    1979
  • 资助金额:
    $ 32.68万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant

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    2018
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