The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Regime Type on the Evolution and Maintenance of International Cooperation

在全球化时代，国家之间的互动越来越常见。各国在许多方面进行合作。例如，他们参与国际协议，相互投资于其他经济体(外国直接投资)，相互借钱(主权债务)。然而，并不是所有国家都平等参与。尽管世界似乎越来越合作，但国际体系的根本无政府主义性质没有改变，也不存在执行协议的最高权威。因此，合作的能力取决于国家之间的信任。例如，只有在信任外国偿还债务的情况下，国家才会借钱给外国。传统的自由主义理论认为，各国通过将未来的行为以当前的互动为条件来加强合作；例如，拒绝向一个国家提供未来的贷款，除非它现在偿还债务。通过使用这种对等惩罚策略，自由主义理论解释了为什么合作是可能的，但它未能解释国家之间合作水平的巨大差异。首席调查员提出了政权类型，领导人的更替是造成这些差异的原因。首席调查人员提出了一种领导人特定惩罚的理论，在该理论中，负责的领导人，而不是她所代表的国家，要为合作的破裂负责。通过拒绝在未来与这位领导人合作，外国制造了一种激励，促使公民罢免他们的领导人，并用新的领导人取而代之。由于外国对这位新领导人没有怨恨，这恢复了国家之间的合作。这一论点表明了国家间合作模式的重要特征。首先，领导人的更替刷新了国家间恶化的关系，正如斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇下台后南斯拉夫与西方国家恢复关系所表明的那样。其次，政体类型影响政体可以合作的程度。政权类型决定了领导人撤职的难易程度。在独裁政权中，更换领导人的成本通常很高，恢复国际合作的好处不太可能补偿公民罢免领导人的成本。这类系统的领导人可以违反国际协定而不受惩罚。在民主制度下，更换领导人要容易得多。因此，民主国家的公民只需更换领导人就可以恢复中断的国际合作。违反国际合作协议或规范的民主领导人有丢掉工作的风险。这使他们更有可能履行承诺，并使他们更值得信任。首席调查人员建议测试政权类型和领导层更替如何在各种背景下影响国家之间的关系。事件数据，如COPDAB，允许构建国家之间的合作指数。使用这些指数，首席调查人员打算研究一个国家如何对另一个国家的行为作出反应，以及这些关系如何受到国内政治机构和领导任期的调节。首席调查员还建议审查二元贸易流动、主权债务、外国直接投资和终止制裁。除了汇编许多现有的数据来源外，拟议的经验研究还需要大量更新领导人数据(Bueno de Mesquita和Severon，1995年)。

In an age of globalization, interactions between states are increasingly common. Nations cooperate on many dimensions. For instance, they participate in international agreements, they invest in each other economies (Foreign Direct Investment) and the lend each other money (sovereign debt). Yet, all nations do not participate equally. Although the world appears increasingly cooperative, the underlying anarchic nature of the international system remains unchanged and no overarching authority exists to enforce agreements. Therefore, the ability to cooperate relies upon trust between nations. For instance, nations will only lend to a foreign state if they trust it to repay its debts. Traditional liberal theory suggests nations enforce cooperation by conditioning future behavior upon current interactions; for instance, by refusing to make future loans to a country unless it repays debts today. Through the use of such reciprocal punishment strategies, liberal theory explains why cooperation is possible, but it fails to account for the great variance in the level of cooperation between states. The Principal Investigators propose regime type and the turnover of leaders accounts for these differences. The Principal Investigators propose a theory of leader specific punishments in which the responsible leader, not the nation she represents, is held accountable for a breakdown in cooperation. By refusing to cooperate with this leader in the future, foreign nations create an incentive for the citizenry to remove their leader and replace her with a new leader. Since foreign nations have no grudge against the new leader, this restores cooperation between states. This argument suggests important features in the pattern of cooperation between states. First, the turnover of leaders refreshes soured relations between states, as the restoration of relations between Yugoslavia and western states following the removal of Slobodan Milosevic illustrates. Second, regime type affects the extent to which regimes can cooperate. Regime type determines the ease of leader removal. In autocratic regimes, where the cost of replacing a leader is typically high, the benefits of restoring international cooperation are unlikely to compensate citizens for the costs of deposing their leader. Leaders in such systems can violate international agreements with impunity. In democratic systems replacing leaders is much easier. As such, the citizens of democracies can restore halted international cooperation by simply replacing their leader. Democratic leaders who violate international agreements or norms of cooperation risk losing their jobs. This makes them more likely to honor their commitments and makes them more trustworthy. The Principal Investigators propose testing how regime type and leadership turnover affects relations between states in a variety of contexts. Events data, such as COPDAB, allow the construct of indices of cooperation between states. Using such indices the Principal Investigators intend to study how one state reacts to the behavior of another and how these relations are moderated by domestic political institutions and leadership tenure. The Principal Investigators also propose examining dyadic trade flows, sovereign debt, foreign direct investment and the termination of sanctions. In addition to compiling numerous existing data sources, the proposed empirical research requires substantial updating of leaders data (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).