Mechanical Explanation in Ancient Greek Philosophy

俄亥俄州立大学西尔维娅·贝里曼“古希腊哲学中的机械解释”项目旨在发展古代自然哲学中机械解释的新特征。人们已经认识到，目前用机械论或机械论来描述古代自然哲学家的做法是有问题的。这个项目认为，术语机械论的适用性并不取决于充要条件，而是取决于通过类比于力学来理解自然过程的方法。以这种方式理解这个术语会引起人们对古代机械艺术思想的发展，并将这些思想应用到对自然世界的理解上。提供了另一种描述古代原子论意义的方法，即存在关于原因的保守主义假设。该项目从一种观点开始，即试图通过单一特征来定义机械论概念是不必要的。机械论通常被描述的许多不同方式，以及开放式清单的出现频率，都表明这个术语在本质上指的是将类比用于力学学科，作为研究自然过程的功能的指导。因此，机械论思想的发展需要发达的机械艺术作为参照点：与实际工作的人工制品进行比较，与想象的概念的作用截然不同。在古代晚期，有证据表明，至少有一些思想家采用了在早期现代世界被证明具有影响力的方法，即试图将自然理解为像构造的装置一样工作。这项工作考察了来自机械艺术的思想被应用于理解自然过程的证据，以及力学被理解为自然哲学的一部分。如此理解，术语机械论与理解古代原子论几乎没有关系。它提出了一种理解原子主义特征的建议，该特征为这种用法提供了可信的证据：无中生有的原则证明了因果关系应该对某些数量限制负责的假设是合理的。这似乎是独立于自然像机器一样工作的观点而发展起来的。这一提议旨在发展一种关于古代自然哲学研究的术语的新概念，从而有助于培养人们对古代力学的发展及其对理解自然过程的思想的影响的哲学兴趣。希望这项研究将有助于培养古代哲学学者对希腊化时期的科学工作与关于自然的哲学思想及其解释之间的互动的新的兴趣。

PROJECT ABSTRACTSES 0240316Sylvia Berryman, Ohio State University"Mechanical Explanation in Ancient Greek Philosophy"This project aims to develop a new characterization of mechanistic explanation inancient natural philosophy. It has been recognized that the current practice of applying the terms mechanical or mechanistic to characterize ancient natural philosophers is problematic. This project argues that the applicability of the term mechanistic does not depend on necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather on a method of understanding natural processes by analogy to mechanics as that is understood. Understanding the term in this way draws attention to developing ideas about the mechanical art in the ancient world, and the application of these to the understanding of the natural world. An alternative way of characterizing the significance of ancient atomism is offered, namely, the presence of conservationist assumptions about causation.The project begins from an argument to the effect that attempts to define mechanistic conceptions by a single characteristic are wanting. Both the many different ways in which the mechanistic is typically characterized, and the frequency of open-ended lists, indicate that the term refers, at heart, to the use of analogy to the discipline of mechanics as a guide in investigating the functioning of natural processes. As such, the development of mechanistic thought requires a developed mechanical art to serve as a point of reference: comparisons to real working artifacts play a role quite different from that of imaginary conceptions. There is evidence in late antiquity that at least some thinkers adopted the approach that proved influential in the early modern world, namely, the attempt to understand nature as working like constructed devices. This work examines evidence that ideas from the mechanical art were applied to the understanding of natural processes, and that mechanics was understood as a part of natural philosophy. So understood, the term mechanistic has little relevance to understanding ancient atomism. It offers a proposal towards understanding the feature of atomism that has lent credence to this usage: the principle that nothing comes from nothing justifies the assumption that causation ought to be answerable to certain quantitative restrictions. This seems to have developed independently of the idea that nature works like a machine.This proposal aims to develop a new conception of the terms in which the study of ancient natural philosophy is framed, and thereby to help foster philosophical interest in the development of ancient mechanics and its impact on ideas about the understanding of natural processes. It is hoped that this research will help foster the renewed interest among scholars of ancient philosophy in the interactions between the scientific work of the Hellenistic period and philosophical ideas about nature and its explanation.